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CHECKING THE DHS: CONSTITUTIONAL
AND SUBCONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES
TO RESOLVING WHETHER NONCITIZENS
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS CAN OBTAIN
EEEECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW OE
NATURALIZATION DECISIONS
MICHAEL CASTLE MILLER*
Eorgotten in the current legislative debates regarding immigration policy is a
deep divide among seven federal circuits over whether immigrants who face
deportation, after applying for and bang denied citizenship, can obtain
judicial review of the citizenship denial. Under a plain reading of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, the answer seems to be yes—courts must
exercise de novo review notwithstanding the pendency of removal proceedings.
One provision prevents the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
from considering applications filed by people facing deportation, but nothing
limits federal courts' powers when the DHS has already made a decision on the
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application or has delayed making a decision for a reason unrelated to the
pending removal proceedings.
Nevertheless, perhaps because of the tremendous deference that the DHS
enjoys under the plenary power doctrine, five U.S. circuit courts of appeal have
construed these statutes to deny judicial review. In practice, the statute has
been turned upside down in these circuits: the DHS regularly considers
naturalization applications even while removal proceedings are pending and
federal courts cannot review the DHS naturalization decisions. Eurthermore,
according to an oft-referenced Bureau of Immigration Appeals case, once
the DHS initiates removal proceedings, immigration judges cannot lift the
process to allow consideration of the naturalization applications without
the DHS's approval.
Consequently, the DHS effectively has discretion to circumvent judicial
revieiv of its naturalization decisions in these circuits whenever it can find a
justification for initiating removal proceedings against the applicant.
Therefore, despite their severity, removal proceedings have noiu become a
litigation tactic for permanently silencing review of naturalization decisions.
This Comment demonstrates that the DHS's power can be challenged both on
constitutional grounds under the procedural due process exception to the
plenary power doctrine and on subconstitutional grounds under the plain text
of the statutes and regulations.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Constitution to give Congress and federal executive
agencies "plenary power"—that is, broad and generally unreviewable
authority—over immigration decisions.' This plenary power doctrine
was perhaps expressed most forcefully in Nishimura Fkiu v. United
States,^ when the Court, in deciding whether a noncitizen's due
process rights were violated, stated that "the decisions of executive or
1. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1626 (1992).
2. 142U.S. 651 (1892).
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administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by
Congress, are due process of law."' Under the doctrine, courts have
tended to grant considerable deference to the government's
immigration decisions, often leaving its discretion unchecked.^
Congressional and executive agency power under this doctrine
appears, at first glance, to be a relic frozen in time, standing in sharp
contrast to the more liberal development of due process and equal
protection rights in most other areas of the law over the last century.^
Over time, courts have softened this contrast by weakening the
plenary power doctrine using both constitutional and
"subconstitutional"® interpretations.'' Under both approaches, courts
bring immigration law more in line with constitutional norms in
other areas of law and raise questions about the continued strength
of the doctrine.*
At a constitutional level, courts have developed a procedural due
process exception to the plenary power doctrine that keeps the
government's substantive decisions in check.^ Whereas the plenary
power doctrine leaves substantive decisions largely unreviewable,'"
this exception allows courts to review the procedural methods
employed to carry out those substantive decisions." Courts therefore
3. Id. at 660 (emphasis added); see also United States ex rel. Knatiff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an ahen denied entry is concerned.").
4. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration. Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constituticmal Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545, 547 (1990).
5. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 1626-27 (contrasting the development of
constitutional protections largely on par with citizens in areas outside of immigration
with a "stunted growth" in the immigration context).
6. This Cominent uses the term "subconstitutional" to refer to statutes and
regulations and the rights and obligations they create. Motomura, supra note 4, at 548.
7. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 1627-30 (describing how the Supreme
Court's use of procedural rights as a surrogate for substantive rights weakens the
plenary power doctrine); Motomura, supra note 4, at 548-50 (asserting that
because of the weakness of constitutional protections in the immigration
context, courts have looked to other sources of law and thereby "undermine [d]
the plenary power doctrine").
8. Motomura, supra note 1, at 1626-27; see also Motomura, supra note 4, at 549-
50 (speculating that the introduction of constitutional principles from mainstream
public law has led to the demise of the plenary power doctrine).
9. Motomura, supra note 1, at 1627-32; iee also infra Part I.A.I (explaining the
procedural due process exception).
10. Substantive immigration decisions can only be strtick down if the government
cannot set forth any rational basis for making them—a very easy standard for the
government to meet. See, eg, Resendiz-Alcaraz v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 383 E.3d 1262,
1271-72 (11th Cir. 2004) (observing that only a rational basis is necessary for federal
statutes that distinguish among groups of noncitizens to withstand an equal
protection challenge).
11. Motomura, supra note 1, at 1627-30; see infra notes 57-60 and accompanying
text (explaining the distinction between "procedural" and "substantive" decisions).
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have a potential back-door approach to addressing substantive
concerns over an immigration agency's power—namely, by finding
"procedural surrogates," or procedural problems with the way that
power is exercised.'^ This approach allows courts to fill some of
the "vacuum" left by the denial of substantive due process rights
for immigrants.''^
At a subconstitutional level, courts have construed immigration
statutes and regulations in ways that make them more consistent with
constitutional norms from outside the immigration context than with
the plenary power doctrine.'* When norms from outside the
immigration context subtly influence statutory interpretation in
this way, immigration scholar Hiroshi Motomura calls them
"phantom constitutional norms."'"' This approach allows courts to
avoid deciding constitutional questions—such as whether an
agency power violates procedural due process or is consistent with
the plenary power doctrine—and to instead frame decisions
through statutory interpretation.'*"
This Comment employs both of these approaches to one issue over
which the plenary power doctrine still has a strong hold: judicial
review of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (the DHS or
"the Department") decisions in naturalization applications after the
DHS initiates removal proceedings." Congress has provided
12. Motomura, supra note 1, at 1627-31. Motomura notes the significant problems
that using "procedural surrogates" cause for the development of the law, yet he regards
them as necessary as long as the plenary power doctrine is in force. Id.
13. Id. at 1631-32.
14. Motomura, supra note 4, at 548-49, 564-66, 573-74; see infra Part I.A.2.
15. Motomura, supra note 4, at 549.
16. Id. at 562-63. As with "procedural surrogates," "phantom norms" necessarily
distort the orderly development of the law. Id. at 549.
17. Removal proceedings are administrative adjudications conducted in the
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) of the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) to determine whether the DHS can lawñiUy remove a noncitizen from the
country. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 to -597 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1224, 1229a-1229c (2012)); see also id. § 371, 100 Stat. at
3009-645. In 1996, Congress began using the term "removal" to encompass botb
"deportation" (forcing a person out of the country) and "exclusion" (preventing a
person outside the country from coming in). Se* id.. §§ 301-304,110 Stat. at 3009-575 to -
597; CHARLES A. WIEGAND, III, FUNDAMENTALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 1 (2011), available at
http://www jus tice.gov/eoir/vll/bencbbook/resources/Fundamentals_of_Immigrati
on_Law.pdf (discussing that before 1996, noncitizens already present in the
United States had the right to a deportation hearing and were afforded greater
procedural safeguards, while noncitizens outside the United States were placed
in exclusion proceedings).
Because this Comment primarily concerns deportation, it uses tbat word in place
of the more modern term, "removal." However, it generally uses "removal
proceedings" rather than the older term "deportation proceedings" except when
discussing proceedings occurring before 1996.
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naturalization applicants with recourse to the federal district courts if
the DHS denies or delays a determination on their applications.'^
Influenced by the plenary power doctrine, however, many circuit
courts have held that noncidzens lose this right when the DHS places
the noncitizen in removal proceedings.'^ Because the criteria that
make noncitizens eligible (or ineligible) for naturalization are
different from the criteria that make them deportable, many
noncitizens in removal proceedings would otherwise be eligible to
naturalize—that is, they meet the requirements for naturalization but
also meet the requirements for deportability.^" Additionally, contrary
to what many circuit courts have held, this Comment demonstrates
that pending removal proceedings should not serve as an absolute
bar to naturalization. Courts should still be able to order the DHS to
naturalize noncitizens who are in removal proceedings.^'
The following hypothetical scenario illustrates the current situation
in many circuits^^: Antonin Lombardi was an Italian citizen who
immigrated with his parents to New York City in 1984 when he was
fourteen-years-old. In 1987, he became a lawful permanent resident,
but two years later he was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for
felony burglary. He was released after three years and began to
reform his life by completing his education, marrying a U.S. citizen,
opening a small business with her, and raising two children.
Mr. Lombardi applied to become a U.S. citizen in 2004, but the
DHS denied his application, citing his 1989 conviction of a "crime[]
involving moral turpitude."^"^ Though Mr. Lombardi met all of the
requirements of naturalization, the DHS nevertheless had discretion
to deny his application based on the applicant's past crimes.̂ "* After
seeking an administrative hearing of the deniaP"* and again being
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (denies); id. § 1447(h) (delays).
19. See ¿n>aPart I.e.I.
20. See infra note 85 (discussing the requirements of naturalization and the
grounds for deportation).
21. See infra Part III.A. (explaining how 8 U.S.C. § 1429 does not preclude orders
to naturalize).
22. This scenario is most similar to the facts of Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135
(2d Cir. 2009), though much of it is common to many cases.
23. See8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)-(b) (2013) (listing "lack of good moral character" as
a reason for denying a naturalization application).
24. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (2012) (codifying the expanded administrative
discretion to consider prior acts); Nagahi v. INS, 219 F.3d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir.
2000) (asserting the relevance of the "good moral character" criterion to an
apphcant with an expunged record); 8 C.F.R. 316.10(a)(2) (allowing consideration
of an individual's prior acts if relevant and if there is no indication of reform).
25. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) ("If, after an examination under section 1446 of this
title, an application for naturalization is denied, the applicant may request a hearing
before an immigration officer."); see afao Baez-Femandez v. INS, 385 F. Supp. 2d 292,
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denied, Mr. Lombardi petitioned a federal district court to review the
denial of his application under 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (c).̂ '̂
Upon learning of the petition, the DHS sought a strategy for
avoiding review. It found one in 8 U.S.C. § 1429. Section 1429
prohibits the DHS from considering a naturalization application if
removal proceedings are pending against the applicant.^^ Thus, if the
DHS could place Mr. Lombardi in removal proceedings, it could
argue in court that it was prevented by statute from even considering
his application, let alone approving it. Luckily for the DHS, it had
considerable flexibility over the decision to initiate removal
proceedings and could place Mr. Lombardi in removal proceedings
based on his 1989 conviction alone.̂ * After initiating the
proceedings, the DHS then moved the district court to dismiss Mr.
Lombardi's petition for review of his naturalization application and
argued that because the DHS could not consider his application, the
court could not review the DHS's denial of the application.-̂ '̂  The
district court granted the motion, following the precedent of the
circuit court above it.'̂ "
Mr. Lombardi then filed a motion to have the Immigration
Judge ("IJ")"̂ ' in his removal case terminate the proceedings under
8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (f) so that the district court could review his
naturalization application denial.^^ However, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has previously held that IJs cannot
terminate removal proceedings without an affirmative
communication from the DHS stating that the person is prima
facie eligible for naturalization.^^ Consequently, the IJ could not
grant Mr. Lombardi's motion to terminate.
294 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting petitioner's claim under § 1421 (c) because he had
not first requested a hearing).
26. See 8 U.S.C. §1421(c) (allowing naturalization applicants who have been
denied by the DHS to seek de novo review before a district court, which can conduct
a hearing upon the applicant's request).
27. Id. § 1429.
28. The DHS seems to frequentiy respond to petitions for judicial review by
initiating removal proceedings against the petitioner. See infra note 255 for
examples. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (detailing the grounds for deponability to be
used in removal proceedings).
29. See ¿n/̂ a Part I.C.I.
30. Five circuits have reasoned similarly. See infra Part l.C. 1.
31. IJs preside over removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(l).
Their decisions are appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) under 8
C.F.R. §1003.1 (b) (2013).
32. See 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (authorizing an IJ to terminate removal proceedings
if (1) there are "exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors" involved, and (2)
the applicant has established he would be "prima facie eligib[le] for naturalization"
but for the pending removal proceedings).
33. In re Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 106 (B.l.A. 2007).
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Because the DHS was the very entity that placed him in removal
proceedings, it was unlikely Mr. Lombardi could convince the DHS to
issue such a communication, but he tried nonetheless. The DHS's
reply** stated that it actually could not determine his prima facie
eligibility because 8 U.S.C. § 1429 prevented it from considering his
application while he was in removal proceedings.̂ "^ Thus, by placing
Mr. Lombardi in removal proceedings, the DHS was able to evade
judicial review of its denial of his naturalization application and
prevent removal proceedings against him from being terminated.
Contrary to what one might expect, this scenario reflects the law in
many circuits.̂ ^ However, several district courts and, recently, two
circuit courts have reasserted the rights of noncitizens to obtain
meaningful judicial review of their naturalization applications while
in removal proceedings.^^ These courts stand in opposition to the
dominant trend of other circuit courts that have decided they cannot
provide remedies when a noncitizen is in removal proceedings."*^
This Comment argues that both the procedural due process and
subconstitutional exceptions to the plenary power doctrine provide
district courts with the authority, in most cases, to grant at least three
types of remedies when reviewing naturalization applications while
removal proceedings are pending. These remedies include ordering
the DHS to naturalize the applicant, issuing a declaratory judgment
that resolves some question of fact in relation to the noncitizen's
case, or declaring that the noncitizen is prima facie eligible for
naturalization but for the pending removal proceedings. Part I of
this Comment describes the evolution of the plenary power doctrine
and its exceptions, the relevant statutes, and the current circuit spht.
Part II argues that granting the DHS the power to limit judicial review
of naturalization applications while removal proceedings are pending
violates noncitizens' procedural due process rights tinder the
Constitution. Part III, however, observes that deciding this
constitutional question is ultimately unnecessary because the relevant
statutes can easily be—and are in fact best—interpreted so as to
require judicial review in this situation.
34. In most cases, the DHS does not reply at all. In the rare instances in which it
does, this reply is common. Se« cases cited infra note 457.
35. The Second and Third Circuits have taken this position, concluding that 8
C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) was simply inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1429 but that it was not
their role to reconcile them. S«« infra notes 223-234 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Parts LC. 1 .a, C.3.
37. S«« infra Part I.C.2.
38. See ¿ri/ra Part I.e.I.a.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS
Although the Supreme Court "ha[s] repeatedly acknowledged the
strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of
administrative action"̂ *̂  in most other areas of law, the immigration
context is often different. This Part explains how the plenary power
doctrine isolated immigration law from general constitutional
norms and how courts have attempted to reconcile the resulting
gap through the procedural due process exception and phantom
constitutional norms. It then describes the emergence of the laws
directly relevant to judicial review of naturalization applications
while removal proceedings are pending. Finally, this Part explains
the current circuit split between courts that have denied judicial
review while removal proceedings are pending and courts that
have granted review.
A. Historical Development of the Plenary Power Doctrine and Its Exceptions
The plenary power doctrine emerged from the very first Supreme
Court cases challenging Congress's immigration decisions.**' Though
the Constitution gave Congress the authority to "establish a uniform
Rule of Naturahzation,""" Congress left immigration largely
unregulated at the federal level until the late nineteenth century,
when anti-Chinese sentiment swept through the Western states.*^
Following federal laws that eliminated Chinese people's ability to
immigrate, three Supreme Court cases during this period—Chae Chan
Ping V. United States ( The Chinese Exclusion Case) ,^^ Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States,'^ and Eong Yue Ting v. United States*^—established that
the government's powers over immigration were generally immune
39. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542 (1988) (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad.
of Eamily Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Motomura, supranote 1, at 1632-38.
4L U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Although the Constitution gave Congress the
power to establish naturalization rules, it was silent as to whether Congress could also
exclude or deport noncitizens. Two Supreme Court cases established that it could.
See Eong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (deport); Chae Chan
Ping V. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889)
(exclude); see also Motomura, supra note 4, at 551-54 (explaining how these cases set
the conceptual framework for early immigration law).
42. Motomura, supra note I, at 1626, 1633.
43. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
44. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
45. 149 U.S. 698(1893).
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from judicial scrutiny unless explicitly provided for by Congress.*®
However, limitations to the plenary power doctrine also developed
early on.
1. The procedural due process exception
The Court first diverged from classic plenary-centric immigration
law in the early twentieth century. In Yamataya v. Fisher ( The Japanese
Immigrant Case),""' the Court, for the first time, upheld a challenge to
a deportation determination by employing a procedural surrogate—
holding that the procedures employed to make the determination
violated due process.** In so doing, the Court drew a distinction
between substance and procedure that continues today: substantive
powers include defining what criteria make a person eligible or
ineligible to naturalize, to enter the country, or to be deported; and
procedural powers include the method for deciding whether a given
individual meets those criteria.*^ Whereas decisions made under the
substantive powers are almost exclusively at the discretion of the
political branches, decisions made under the procedural powers are
subject to review.̂ "
Yamatayd?, scope was primarily confined to the deportation (not
exclusion) context. Thus, noncitizens already in the country could,
at least in theory, challenge the procedural mechanisms for kicking
them out, but those outside the country wanting to be let in could
not.^' Courts rarely applied Yamataya, however, which made
46. See Motomura, supra note 4, at 551-53; iee also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. at 606, 609 (stressing tbe foreign policy and sovereignty considerations involved
in such decisions).
47. 189 U.S. 86(1903).
48. Id. at 99-101; Motomura, supra note 1, at 1637. Yamataya involved a
challenge from a Japanese citizen the government had attempted to deport four days
after she arrived in the United States. Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 87. Although the Court
upheld Congress's creation of substantive criteria defining what makes a noncitizen
deportable, it nevertheless held she could challenge the administrative procedures
that were employed in determining whether she met those criteria. Id. at 97, 100.
Thus, while she could not challenge Congre.ss's substantive decision to make
noncitizens who were "likely to become a public charge" deportable, she could
challenge the procedures employed to identify her as such. See id. at 97-101.
49. Motomura, supranote I, at 1637-39.
50. Id. Substantive immigration decisions have been shielded from judicial
scrutiny in part because of their relationship to the political question doctrine—tbat
is, they conceivably implicate foreign policy and sovereignty concerns. Id. at 1646-
50, 1697-98. Procedural matters, however, are traditionally within tbe judiciary's
competence. Id. at 1646.
51. Motomura, supra note 4, at 554-60. There were at least two rationales behind
this distinction. First, the Court had already established that the Constitution applies
to all people within U.S. borders, including noncitizens. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (extending Fourteenth Amendment due process to
noncitizens); lee also Motomura, supra note 4, at 565-66 (discussing Yick Wo as the
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procedural process arguments largely ineffective until the Court's
1982 Landon v. Plasencia decision.̂ ^ In that case, the Court opened
the door to procedural due process challenges, which had flourished
outside of the immigration context in the 1970s.''̂  Statutory
entitlements to noncitizens then became recognized as forms of
property that the government could only deprive using adequate
procedures.'^ Noncitizens seeking to enter the country also found
more protection under the procedural due process exception at this
point.̂ ^ Nevertheless, courts have been still much more willing to
provide procedural due process protections in the deportation
context than in the exclusion context.^^
case protecting lawfully present noncitizens "from invidious discrimination at state
hands"). However, the Court did not apply such protections to noncitizens seeking
to enter the country and were therefore outside U.S. jurisdiction. Motomura, supra
note 4, at 565-69; .see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (continuing to
uphold this distinction).
Second, persons currently in the United States have, in theory, established greater
ties to the country and thus have more at stake when facing removal than persons
denied entry at the border. See Johnson v. Eisenträger, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)
(describing how noncitizens "ha[ve] been accorded a generous and ascending scale
of rights as [they] increase [ their] identit[ies] with our society"). This reasoning was
significantly undermined, however, when the Court held that exclusion authority
applies every time a noncitizen crosses the border, regardless of whether the person
is a permanent resident who had left the country only briefly. See United States ex rel.
Volpe V. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933); Motomura, supra note 4, at 557 & n.57
(noting that the Court in Volpe made no distinction between excludable and
deportable noncitizens and that the noncitizen's long-term ties to the cotintry were
inconsequential); iee, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
208, 213 (1953) (denying procedural due process rights to a twenty-five-year lawful
permanent resident who, after briefiy leaving the United States to visit his dying
mother in Eastern Europe, was detained at Ellis Island for two years based on
confidential information because he, unlike the noncitizen in Yamataya, was seeking
to "enter" the United States rather than to prevent his deportation).
52. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
53. Id. at 32 (finding that the plaintiff could assert due process rights when
returning to the country but declining to clarify the particular protections afforded);
Motomura, supra note 1, at 1652-56.
54. Motomura, supra note 1, at 1651-54 (identifying Goldberg v. Kelly, 379 U.S.
254 (1970) as the beginning of a "due process revolution" that entered the
immigration context via Plasencia). The Court began to analyze three factors to test
the adequacy of procedures: (1) the nature of the private interest that the official
action affects; (2) the risk that the procedures employed would lead to erroneous
deprivation of that interest and the likelihood that other procedures would have
lessened that risk; and (3) the government's interest in employing those procedures,
taking into account the financial or administrative burden of performing the same
function with added or different procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976); 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 957 (2013); êe infra notes 304-320 and
accompanying text (discussing courts' applications of this test).
55. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 1630, 1653-55 (noting that noncitizens'
lawyers began making the tactical decision to construct constitutional challenges as
procedural instead of substantive).
56. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 693 (asserting that procedural rights are
applicable within the deportation setting and using this determination to read a
"reasonable time" limitation into a statute concerning post-removal-decision
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One of the key difficulties in applying the procedural due process
exception is drawing a distinction between "substantive" and
"procedural" powers. However, there are some rhetorical methods of
distinguishing between the two. Laws that are quintessentially
substantive typically involve the establishment of categories."^^
Examples include statutes that define which types of people should
be admitted into the country and which should be deported or
excluded.^^ Laws that are quintessentially procedural, however,
typically dictate the manner in which the substantive categorization is
to be applied.̂ ^ Examples of the latter include statutes that require a
hearing on whether a person should be placed in the "admit"
category or the "exclude" category.®"
2. Phantom constitutional norms
The trend of applying phantom constitutional norms to interpret
statutes emerged subtly.''' For example, although the Court has
always refused to characterize deportation as "punishment," which
would invoke constitutional safeguards common to criminal law, it
has come close.̂ ^ Writing for the majority in Bridges v. Wixori''^ and
detentions); Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 26-34 (noting several differences between rights
afforded to the deportation and exclusion contexts).
57. Motomura, supra note 1, at 1629, 1664 n.200; see also Resendiz-Alcaraz v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that substantive challenges
of this nature are only subject to rational basis review).
58. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2012) (defining deportable and excludable
noncitizens, respectively).
59. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 1629 (noting that a procedural challenge
involves a claim that a noncitizen has not been given the opportunity to challenge
whether he or she qualifies under a particular substantive category).
60. Id. at 1629, 1664 n.2OO; see, e.g, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (oudining procedures that
must be followed when placing someone in removal proceedings); see also Escobar v.
INS, 896 F.2d 564, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[A] substantive provision is one that
grants a status, whereas a procedural provision is one subordinate to the
substantive grant and focusing on how or when a decision is to be made to award
the previously authorized substantive status."), withdrawn, reh'g en bane granted.
No. 89-5037 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 1990), and appeal dismissed, vacated as moot, 925
F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1991). This point is illustrated further below using Escobar.
Infra notes 276-95.
61. See Motomura, supra note 4, at 564-73 (tracing the practice of applying
phantom constitutional norms to interpret statutes by reviewing pro-immigrant cases
outside the immigration context as strictiy defined—that is, outside of the
naturalization/exclusion/removal context—such as Yick Wo).
62. See, e.g. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (referring to
removal as a "penalty" but not a "criminal sanction"); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (establishing that "deportation is not a
punishment for crime"); see also Motomura, supra note 4, at 553 (detailing that
Fong Yue Ting "dismiss [ed] the idea that deportation should trigger the more
stibstantial constitutional safeguards associated with punishment" (internal
quotations omitted) ).
63. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
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Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,^ Justice Douglas based a pro-noncitizen
interpretation of deportation statutes on the severe, punishment-like
consequences of deportation, considering it "a drastic measure" that
could be "at times the equivalent of banishment or exile."''̂
Emphasizing the extreme nature of deportation, the Court in Fong
Haiu Tan established that ambiguous deportation statutes or
regulations must be read in the light most favorable to the person
facing deportation.'''' In these cases, the Court appeared to let
constitutional norms applicable in criminal law subtly affect its
interpretation of deportation statutes, even though the most
directly applicable constitutional norm would have been the
plenary power doctrine.®^
Using phantom constitutional norms in this way represents a
departure from the typical relationship between constitutional law
and statutory interpretation. Typically, under the principle of
constitutional avoidance, judges avoid direct interpretation of the
Constitution by construing challenged statutes in a way that brings
them in line with applicable constitutional norms.''*' Thus, the
applicable constitutional norms stand in the background, subtly
exerting a "pull," or influence, molding the statutes into conformity
with the constitution.®® What is unusual about phantom
constitutional norms, however, is that they "pull" the statutes away
from the underlying background constitutional doctrine—the
plenary power doctrine—and toward other, more mainstream
64. 333 U.S. 6(1948).
65. Id. at 10; Bridges, 326 U.S. at 147 ("[A]lthough deportation technically is not
criminal punishment, it may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the deprivation
of the right to pursue a vocation or a calling." (citations omitted)); Motomura, supra
note 4, at 567-68. S«« generally Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (stating that removal is a
"particularly severe penalty" that has been "intimately related to the criminal
process," despite its status as a civil proceeding (internal quotation marks omitted) ).
66. Fong Haw Tan, 353 U.S. at 10 (asserting that the impact that deportation has
upon individuals is so strong as to necessitate a stricter standard than might
otherwise be appropriate). See generally Motomura, supia note 4, at 568 (arguing that
Fong Haw Tan was an important step in the development of the use of' statutory
interpretation for protecting individual rights of immigrants).
67. Motomura, supra note 4, at 567-68.
68. Id. at 560-61; ê«, e.g, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) ("[I]t is a
cardinal principle of statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of Congress raises
a serious doubt as to its constitutionality, this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Though commonly employed, the practice is not without its critics. Se«,
«.g-., RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285 (1985) (asserting
that a canon that encourages Judges to avoid constitutional conflict does not actually
constrain them but instead encourages 'Judge-made 'penumbra[s] '" that expand the
reach of the Constitution too far).
69. Motomura, supra note 4, at 564.
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constitutional norms.™ In other words, phantom norms tend to
render statutes inconsistent with the plenary power doctrine and
more consistent with norms commonly followed outside the
immigration context.''
Nagahi v. INS''^ provides an example of phantom norms guiding
statutory interpretation and invokes the statutes relevant to this
Comment. In Nagahi, the petitioner challenged a rule limiting the
time period in which noncitizens could file claims for judicial review
of naturalization applications under 8 U.S.C. §1421(c) after an
administrative denial of the application for citizenship.'^ The
government contended that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)'̂ '' had the authority to limit access to judicial review
under 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (a), which gave the INS the "sole authority to
naturalize persons,"''"' and under other statutes that granted the INS
general authority to establish regulations necessary for carrying out
its responsibilities.̂ ®
Applying norms from outside the plenary power and immigration
contexts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
the INS did not have the authority to limit the scope of judicial review
over its decisions." The court relied on the Supreme Court's
statement in Bowen v. Georgetown University HospitaP that "a statutory
grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter,
be understood to encompass the power to promulgate [limits on
judicial review] unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express
terms."™ The court also applied Adams Eruit Co. v. Barrett,^'^ in which
70. M. at 564-65, 573-74.
71. Id. at 549-50; see, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (applying phantom norms
almost explicitly by rejecting the literal meaning of the statute and interpreting
it in a way that conformed to constitutional norms uninfluenced by the plenary
power doctrine).
72. 219 E.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2000).
73. See id. at 1168-69 (explaining that the petitioner's counsel continued
with an administrative action within the INS rather than filing an appeal with the
district court within the 120-day limitation created by the INS regulation); see also
8 C.F.R. § 336.9(b) (2013) (indicating that since 1991, there has been a time
limit of 120 days).
74. The INS was an agency within the DOJ until 2003 when its immigration
enforcement and services responsibilities were transferred to newly created DHS. See
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
75. 8 U.S.C. §1421 (a) (2012).
76. Nagahi, 219 F.3d at 1169-70 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a) (3), 1443(a)).
77. Id. at 1170-71 (noting that limitation authority was beyond the scope of the
congressionally delegated authority).
78. 488U.S. 204 (1988).
79. Nagahi, 219 E.3d at 1170 (alteration in original) (quoting Bowen, 488 U.S. at
208) (noting that the Court was referring to retroactive rtiles, not judicial review).
80. 494 U.S. 638(1990).
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the Court stated that an agency could not control the scope of
statutorily mandated judicial review.*'
Thus, under these exceptions to the plenary power doctrine,
immigrants facing deportation can seek judicial review of adverse
naturalization decisions in at least two ways: they can claim that
denying judicial review violates procedural due process, or they can
seek an interpretation of the relevant statutes that bring them in line
with mainstream constitutional norms.
B. Historical Development of the Current Laws Affecting Judicial Review of
Naturalization Applications While Removal Proceedings Are Pending
Until 1990, Congress gave federal district courts the exclusive
authority to naturalize noncitizens and the Attorney General the
power to deport them if they were not yet naturalized.*- Under the
pre-1990 framework, naturalization occurred in two steps after a
noncitizen filed an application. First, the Attorney General made a
recommendation to the court that the noncitizen was prima facie
eligible for naturalization.*'' Second, the court held a final hearing
on naturalization, and, if appropriate, naturalized the noncitizen.**
Because the requirements for naturalization only partially
overlapped with the grounds for deportability, many noncitizens were
both eligible for naturalization and deportable at the same time.*^
81. See id. at 650 (holding that the U.S. Department of Labor could not limit a
statutory cause of action granted to migrant workers injured due to their failtire to
comply with vebicle safety provisions); Nagahi, 219 F.3d at 1170 (asserting tbat the
INS was similarly constrained in regulating its judicial review authority).
82. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (1988) ("Exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize
persons as citizens of the United States is conferred upon . . . District courts of
the United States . . . ."), with Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,
§ 401, 104 Stat. 4978, 5038 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (2012))
("The sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States is
conferred upon the Attorney General.").
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a)-(d) (1988).
84. Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2009) (identifying the pre-
1990 naturalization and removal process); seen U.S.C. § 1421 (a) (1988).
85. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423, 1427 (a) (1952) (providing tbe core requirements
of eligibihty), with id. § 1251 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012))
(providing the grounds for deportation).
Currently, the core requirements of eligibility for naturalization are (1) five years
of continuous residence after becoming a lawful permanent resident; (2) evidence of
good moral cbaracter during tbat period; and (3) an understanding of tbe English
language, history, principles, and form of government of the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1423, 1427(a) (2012).
Some of the grounds for deportation include (1) being inadmissible or otherwise
unlawfully present at the time of entry or adjustment of status or violating status
(including securing a visa by fraud, marrying for the purpose of procuring
admission, etc.); (2) engaging in criminal activity, including commission "of a crime
involving moral turpitude" within five years of admission (or ten years in the case of a
legal permanent resident) that has a possible prison sentence of one year or longer.
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Thus, at times, noncitizens would successfully obtain the Attorney
General's recommendation of prima facie eligibility but the INS
would initiate deportation proceedings before the noncitizen was
naturalized.***" In this situation, prior to 1950, the naturalization
proceedings and deportation proceedings would progress
simultaneously until the completion of one naturally foreclosed the
possibility of the other.^' This led to a "race" in which immigrants
would seek to be naturalized by the court before the Attorney
General could deport them.*^
Congress intended to end this race in 1950 by enacting what
became 8 U.S.C. § 1429, which at that time prohibited the courts
from holding a final hearing on petitions for naturalization once the
INS had begun deportation proceedings.^^ The provision also
prohibited noncitizens from being naturalized if the Attorney
General had issued a final order of deportation.^" This statute was
termed the "priority provision" because Congress intended it to give
deportation proceedings priority over naturalization proceedings so
that the latter could not be conducted unless and until the former
had been resolved in the noncitizen's favor.̂ '
By 1955, the Attorney General had balanced the priority given to
deportation proceedings by granting the BIA authority to terminate
deportation proceedings to allow a court to hear a noncitizen's
naturalization petition.**'̂  In 1974, the government added standards
for the BIA's exercise of its discretion by promulgating 8 C.F.R.
§ 1239.2(f).̂ '̂  Under this regulation, an IJ can only terminate
commission of two or more of stich unconnected crimes any time after admission,
and commission of an aggravated felony; (3) failing to register or falsifying
documents; (4) posing a security threat; (5) becoming a public charge within five
years of admission; and (6) voting unlawfully. Id. § 1227.
86. Pemeöo, 579 F.3d at 139.
87. Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 543-44 (1955).
88. Id.
89. Congress initially passed the priority provision in the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, Pub L. No. 81-831, § 27, 64 Stat. 987, 1015. This provision was
adopted, unchanged, in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub L. No. 82-
414, § 318, 66 Sut. 163, 244 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1429). See Shomberg,
348 U.S. at 543-44.
90. 8U.S.C. §1429 (1952).
91. See Shomberg, 348 U.S. at 543-45 (analyzing priority sections from the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 and giving the priority section here the
same meaning—namely, giving it "immediate prospective and retroactive effect").
92. Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining this
history); Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 907 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that to
terminate removal proceedings, there must he a pending application because
regulations only authorize termination to allow the DHS to consider a noncitizen's
application (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2003))); In re B—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 713, 720
(B.I.A. 1955) (citing 8 C.F.R. §6.1 (d)(l) (1952)).
93. Perriello, 579 F.3d at 139.
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deportation proceedings if (1) the noncitizen "has established prima
facie eligibility for naturalization" and (2) "the matter involves
exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors."^^ If these two
elements are not met, the DHS must issue a final order of
deportation as soon as possible."''
The year after enactment of the rule, however, the BIA narrowed
the scope of § 1239.2 (f) in In re Cruz^^ by holding that the "prima
facie eligibility" requirement could only be satisfied by either an
affirmative communication from the Attorney General (via the INS)
or a declaration from a district court.**' IJs, therefore, could not
determine an applicant's prima facie eligibility on their own
authority.'̂ ** Thus, IJs could no longer terminate deportation
proceedings absent a communication from the Agency or a court that
the noncitizen was prima facie "eligible for naturalization but for the
pendency of the deportation proceedings."^^
Then, in 1990, Congress conducted a massive overhaul of the
immigration and naturalization systems, making three relevant
changes.'"" First, Congress transferred exclusive authority to
naturalize noncitizens from the district courts to the Attorney
General, thus giving the Attorney General the authority both to
naturalize and to deport."" Second, Congress updated the language
in 8 U.S.C. § 1429 to state that the Attorney General, rather than the
court, was now prohibited from considering applications for
94. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(0 (2013).
95. Id. The regulation requires this even if the noncitizen has a pending
application for naturalization or a pending claim for judicial review. Id.; see Campos
V. INS, 16 F.3d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1994) (deciding that the BIA is not required to stay
a removal order until a noncitizen obtains Jtidicial review of his application denial).
96. 15 I. & N. Dec. 236 (B.l.A. 1975).
97. Id. at 237; se« also Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189, 192, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2003)
(upholding the requirement even though the noncitizen presented evidence that his
discharge from the military was honorable and the removal proceedings were
premised on his alleged "other than honorable" discharge).
98. Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 237. Even though IJs reviewed citizenship claims, the
BIA reasoned that because Congress had not given them the atithority to naturalize
aliens, they also did not have the authority to determine prima facie eligibility. Id.
99. Id. at 237. This requirement appears to be only sporadically followed or
enforced, as IJs often do terminate removal proceedings even without an affirmative
communication from the DHS. See Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135, 139, 141
(2d Cir. 2009); e.g, Nesari v. Taylor, 806 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (E.D. Va. 2011)
(stating that an IJ had terminated removal proceedings without the DHS or apparent
censure from the BIA); Frétas v. Hansen, No. l:06CV1475, 2008 WL 4404276, at *12
(N.D. Ohio, Sept. 23, 2008) (noting that the IJ terminated removal proceedings due
to humanitarian factors).
100. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C).
101. Id. § 401(a), 104 Stat. at 5038 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a)
(2012)) (providing the sole authority to naturalize); Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229,
236 (2d Cir. 2008) (detailing the consolidation of authority).
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naturalization while deportation proceedings were pending.'"^
Third, Congress gave federal district courts the power to review
applications when they had been denied'""^ or had taken more than
120 days to come to a decision.'"* This last provision was intended to
preserve recourse for aliens who could not get their applications
approved.'"^ It also placed a check on the Attorney General's
otherwise nearly unreviewable discretion over naturalization.""'
On March 1, 2003, the newly created U.S. Department of
Homeland Security assumed the Attorney Ceneral's responsibilities
over naturalization and removal.'"^ The DHS divided these
responsibilities between two of its agencies: U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) would have authority to naturalize
noncitizens under § 1421 (a),"* and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) would have authority to initiate removal
proceedings.'"® Power to adjudicate removal proceedings was left
with the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency
under the Attorney General, and ICE could only execute a removal
following a final removal order from the EOIR.
The combination of the 1990 statutory changes and the 2003
changes to the relevant administrative structure have created an
102. Gonzalez v. Sec'y of DHS, 678 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012). Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1429 (1952) ("[N]o petition for naturalization .shall be finally heard by a naturalization
court if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding . . . ."
(emphasis added)), luith 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (2012) ("[N]o application for naturalization
shall be considered by the Attorney Ceneral if there is pending against the applicant a
removal proceeding . . . ." (emphasis added)).
103. Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 401 (a), 104 Stat. at 5038 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1421 (c) (2012)).
104. Id. § 407(d)(14), 104 Stat. at 5044 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§1447(b)).
105. Gonzafez, 678 F.3d at 260 & n.9.
106. See Ngwana v. Att'y Gen., 40 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321-22 (D. Md. 1999)
(explaining the limited options for noncitizens if Judicial review can be
circumvented). The only other statute granting courts Jurisdiction to review the
DHS decisions of any kind is 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which allows for a very limited review of
final orders of removal and for review of alleged constitutional violations at any time.
No other statute authorizes review of naturalization applications.
107. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. As a
result, the term "Attorney General" in each of the statutes discussed in this
Comment can now be substituted with "the DHS," or, more specifically, with the
relevant agency within the DHS. Awe v. Napolitano, 494 F. App'x 860, 862 n.3
(10th Cir. 2012).
108. 6U.S.C. §271(b).
109. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010-
2014, at 3, 5-7 (2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports
/strategic-plan/strategic-plan-2010.pdf (indicating that one of ICE's key priorities is
to detect and remove individuals seeking to enter the United States illegally as well as
those individuals who pose a national security threat); êe also 6 U.S.C. §§452(a),
542 (b) (providing the authority for the creation of this Agency).
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interesting interplay between 8 U.S.C. §§ 1429, 1421 (a), and judicial
review under §§ 1421(c) and 1447(b). Under § 1421(a), USCIS has
exclusive authority to naturalize noncitizens."" However, § 1429
prohibits USCIS from considering naturalization applications if ICE
has initiated removal proceedings against the applicant."' Section
1421 (c) allows naturalization applicants to seek judicial review when
USCIS denies their applications after exhausting administrative
remedies."^ Section 1447(b) allows applicants to seek judicial review
when USCIS does not make a determination in a timely manner."''
Even though the text of § 1429 makes no facial reference to the
courts, a plurality of circuits have held that it nevertheless limits the
courts' powers of judicial review under §§ 1421 (c) and 1447(b) when
removal proceedings are pending."*
Furthermore, all of these changes occurred without corresponding
changes to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (f), which authorizes IJs to terminate
removal proceedings.""^ For many years, courts doubted whether the
Cruz interpretation of this regulation—that prima facie eligibility
determinations must come from either the agency (now the DHS) or
the courts—was still valid after the 1990 changes."® The U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits doubted that
district courts still have the authority to issue declarations of prima
facie eligibility given that the DHS now has the sole authority to
naturalize."^ In Apokarina v. Ashcrofl,^^^ the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit took the opposite approach—questioning whether
the DHS could make these declarations now that § 1429 prevented
the DHS from even considering applications."'' The Third Circuit
reasoned that a determination of whether noncitizens are prima facie
eligible for naturalization would involve at least some consideration
of their applications.'^"
110. 8U.S.C. §1421(a).
111. Id. § 1429.
112. 7á. §1421(c).
113. M §1447(b).
114. See ¿n/ra Part I.C.I.
115. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2013); Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 E.3d 135, 140 (2d
Cir. 2009).
116. Perriello, 579 F.3d at 140 (explaining this split).
117. See, e.g., Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2007); De Lara
Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004); Zayed v. United States,
368 F.3d 902, 907 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004).
118. 93 E. App'x 469 (3d Cir. 2004).
119. /á. at 470, 472.
120. Id. at 471-72; see also Perriello, 579 E.3d at 138 (explaining that considering an
application is a prerequisite to determining prima facie eligibility).
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In the estimation of some courts, the BIA resolved this question in
2007 in In re Acosta Hidalgo.^^^ In that case, the BIA stated in dictum
that district courts could not declare that an alien was prima facie
eligible for naturalization to satisfy § 1239.2(f) because the courts no
longer had "authority over naturalization proceedings."'^^ According
to the BLA, only the DHS could satisfy this requirement by issuing an
affirmative declaration.'-'' The BIA did not address how the DHS
could make these declarations when the DHS was prohibited from
considering applications under § 1429.'̂ *
In its central holding,'^^ The BIA in Acosta Hidalgo reaffirmed its
prohibition from Cruz against IJs establishing prima facie eligibility
on their own.'̂ '' In Acosta Hidalgo, the BIA reasoned that the DHS
had more expertise than IJs to determine an applicant's eligibility.'^'
In dissent, BIA member Filppu criticized the decision as allowing the
DHS to veto termination of deportation proceedings merely by
remaining silent.''̂ *
Acosta Hidalgo put in place the final piece of a statutory, regulatory,
and interpretive shield that effectively blocks district courts from
exercising judicial review over the DHS's decisions when removal
121. 24 I. & N. Dec. 103 (B.l.A. 2007). For a discussion of subsequent courts'
treatment of this case, see infra notes 217-239 and accompanying text.
122. Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 103, 105. This rendering of § 1421 (a)
overstates the DHS's authority and perhaps misled the BIA's decision. Section
1421 (a) only states that "[t]he sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the
United States is conferred upon [the DHS]." 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (2012). Courts are
not precluded from having a role in the naturalization process simply because the
DHS has "[t]he sole authority to naturalize," as courts can still make prima facie
eligibility determinations or even order the DHS to natundize a person. See infra Part
m.A.2.
123. Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 105-06.
124. Perriello, 579 F.3d at 140. Mistakes like the BIA's misstatement of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1421 (a), see supra note 122, and failure to consider § 1429 might be inevitable
considering tbe BIA's caseload. In 2007, for example, the eleven members of the
BIA issued 35,393 decisions. ExEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OE
JUSTICE, FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at SI (2008), awiMfe ai http://wwwjtistice.gov
/eoir/statspub/fy07syb.pdf; Lenni B. Benson, You Can't Get There From Here:
Managing Judicial Itevieiu of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 417
(indicating that tbe number of BIA members fluctuates but tbat in 2007, there were
eleven members). For a description of bow this volume might affect the quality of
the BIA's decision making, see supranotes 315-319 and accompanying text.
125. The statement about district courts not being able to issue prima facie
eligibility declarations was dictum because the petitioner was only seeking to have an
IJ—not a federal district court—declare him prima facie eligible to naturalize. See
Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 103-06. Dicta is not binding on future cases. See
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821) (observing that statements in
opinions that "go beyond the case . . . may be respected, but ought not to control the
judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision").
126. Aco.sta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 105-06.
127. Id. at 106 & n.8.
128. Id. at 110 (Filppu, Board Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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proceedings are in process. In sum, the BIA in Acosta Hidalgo
asserted that courts could no longer declare a noncitizen's prima
facie eligibility for naturalization to help terminate removal
proceedings.'^^ Instead, according to the BIA, only the DHS could
make these declarations, even though the DHS was the entity that
initiated removal proceedings in the first place and rarely, if ever,
made such declarations.'^" This makes it extremely unlikely under
Acosta Hidalgo that a noncitizen can ever have removal proceedings
terminated under § 1239.2(f).'^' Additionally, having removal
proceedings pending also means that, in many circuits, noncitizens
cannot obtain meaningful judicial review of their denied or delayed
applications under §§ 1421(c) or 1447(b).'^^ This lack of judicial
review is due to many courts' decisions that § 1429, which prevents
the DHS from considering noncitizens' applications after it has
initiated removal proceedings against them, limits the courts' ability
to grant relief.'̂ ^
These interpretations have given the DHS the ability to effectively
circumvent congressional and agency-created avenues of relief for
noncitizens by initiating removal proceedings.'̂ "* Although Congress
provided noncitizens a right to judicial review by enacting 8 U.S.C.
§§1421(c) and 1447 (b), the DHS can shield itself from these
provisions in most circuits by initiating removal proceedings.'^^
Additionally, 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (f) provides noncitizens a means of
terminating removal proceedings, but the DHS can withhold an
element necessary for terminating the proceedings merely by
remaining silent.'^'' The federal court interpretations approving this
procedure authorize the DHS to effectively nullify the statutory and
129. Id. at 105-06 (majority opinion).
130. See infra notes 455>-457 (detailing examples of the DHS unresponsiveness) ; see also
Prosecutorial Discretion: A Statistical Analysis, IMMIGR. POL'Y CENTER 1 (fune 1, 2012),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/pd_-_a_stastical_assessment
_061112.pdf (discussing the DHS's lack of willingness to close removal proceedings
itself, which it does in less than eight percent of cases, despite the Department's
authority to close low-priority removal proceedings).
131. See infra Part I.C.3 (describing the Acosta Hidalgo chilling effect).
132. See ¿n/ra Part I.C.I.
133. See ¿n/ra Part I.C.I.
134. Gonzalez v. Sec'y of DHS, 678 F.3d 254, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2012) (nodng that
the possibility that judicial review could be cut off by the Attorney General is contrary
to congressional intent).
135. Id.
136. In re Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 109 (B.I.A. 2007) (Filppu, Board
Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding fault with previous BLA
decisions that constrain its authority despite the regulatory language).
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regulatory protections.'^' The cases that follow demonstrate several
examples of courts wrestling with the implications of these
interpretations and the justifications for maintaining them. They also
display a growing movement to upend these interpretations.'^^
C. The Split over Judicial Review of Naturalization Applications While
Removal Proceedings Are Pending
The central question that has surfaced from the evolution of these
statutes and regulations is whether and to what degree noncitizens
can still obtain effective judicial review of their naturalization
applications after the DHS has initiated removal proceedings against
them. Courts have construed the relevant statutes in a variety of ways.
A plurality of jurisdictions have concluded that courts cannot provide
noncitizens with a remedy in this situation. However, other courts
have come to the opposite conclusion and provided certain remedies
to noncitizens. Additionally, courts have taken opposing positions on
whether the BIA's statement in Acosta Hidalgo is effective to limit their
ability to grant declaratory judgments. Finally, while a few courts
have considered due process challenges to denying judicial review,
none of these courts have attempted a serious analysis of the
potential due process arguments available to noncitizens.
1. Jurisdictions in which district courts cannot grant relief
Five out of seven circuits have construed 8 U.S.C. § 1429 to prevent
courts from exercising effective judicial review of naturalization
determinations when the apphcants are in removal proceedings. The
DHS, however, appears to still review naturalization applications even
though § 1429 explicitly prohibits the Department, not the courts,
from doing so.
a. Limitations on courts
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have decided that pending removal
proceedings prevent the courts from awarding any form of relief.'̂ ^
137. See Kestelboym v. Chertoff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (D.NJ. 2008) (noting
that allowing the Department to avoid judicial review would "trump" the regime
intended by Congress).
138. See infra Part I.C.2.
139. See Awe v. Napolitano, 494 F. App'x 860, 861, 866 (10th Cir. 2012); Barnes v.
Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 806-07 (4th Cir. 2010) (dicta); Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d
229, 240 (2d Cir. 2008); Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir.
2007); De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2004); Zayed v.
United States, 368 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004).
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Readers interested in civil procedure may find interesting the various methods by
which these courts have dismissed the cases. A variety of procedural mechanisms
have been explored.
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As a technical matter, a consensus of these courts hold that they have subject matter
jurisdiction to review the naturalization applications but are nevertheless prevented
from granting any remedy. See, e.g.. Awe, 494 F. App'x at 866-67; De Lara Bellajaro,
378 F.3d at 1046; Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906.
In Barnes, the Fourth Circuit stated that district courts lacked Jurisdiction when
removal proceedings were pending. Barnes, 625 F.3d at 805-06. However, its
reasoning was entirely based on the court's inability to grant effective relief. See id. at
806-07. Furthermore, the statement was made in dictum because Barnes did not
involve a petitioner seeking Judicial review of a naturalization application; rather, the
petitioner sought review of an IJ's decision that the IJ could not terminate removal
proceedings under Acosta Hidalgo. Id. at 803-05; see also Ka Lok Lau v. Holder, 880 F.
Supp. 2d 276, 279 (D. Mass. 2012) ("The Fourth Circuit [in Barnes] reviewed a
completely separate issue . . . ."). The question arose because the noncitizen argued
that Acosta Hidalgo deprived him of his right to Judicial review under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1421 (c). Id. at 8̂ 06. The court concluded that noncitizens in removal proceedings
simply did not have the right to this kind of Judicial review. Id.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit in Saba-Bakare dodged the Jurisdiction issue in
relation to the noncitizen's claim under § 1447(b), reasoning that, regardless of
whether the court had Jurisdiction, it could not grant relief. Saba-Bakare, 507 F.3d at
340-41; accorá Agarwal v. Napolitano, 663 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
Also, when reviewing the challenge under § 1421 (c), the court held it did not have
Jurisdiction but not because the noncitizen was in removal proceedings. Saba-Bakare,
507 F.3d at 340. It instead denied Jurisdiction because there was not a valid
"denial"—an element required by 1421 (c). Id. at 339-40. In that case, the DHS had
issued a denial of the noncitizen's application, but the court declared the denial
invalid because the DHS was not authorized to consider the noncitizen's application
while he was in removal proceedings. See id. Thus, without a valid denial, the court
held it could not assert Jurisdiction under §1421(c). See id.; infra note 350
(analyzing this approach); see also infra Part l.C.l.b (discussing the DHS's practice of
disregarding § 1429 and considering applications regardless of whether removal
proceedings are pending).
Furthermore, the Second Circuit also dodged the Jurisdiction issue when an
applicant brought a claim under § 1447(b) in Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 237-38. The court
accepted Jurisdiction merely because the parties did not contest it but expressed
serious doubts over whether it in fact had Jurisdiction. Id. For a discussion of this
case, see infranote 377.
Failure to State a Claim and Mootness
If the court finds it has subject matter Jurisdiction but cannot grant a remedy,
dismissal under FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b) (6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted" appears most appropriate. See, e.g., Ajlani, bAb F.3d at 233, 241
(upholding the district court's dismissal on this ground); see also Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at
259 n.5 (explaining that if a court cannot grant a remedy, dismissal under Rule
12(b) (6) is proper). If a court cannot remedy the petitioner's situation, there is no
"claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CI\'. P. 12(b) (6) (emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuit, however, took a difl̂ erent approach in Awe, 494 F. App'x at
865-66. It concluded that claims for Judicial review become moot the moment the
DHS initiates removal proceedings against the claimant and thus fail Article Ill's
requirement of a case or controversy. Id. Under the court's test, cases become moot
if courts can no longer order effective relief due to a change in circumstances after
the claim was filed. Id. at 866. In Awe, the petitioner filed his claim for Judicial
review with the court, and the DHS then initiated removal proceedings and moved to
dismiss. Id. at 862, 866. The Tenth Circuit construed the DHS's initiation of
removal proceedings as a change of circumstances that mooted the petitioner's
claim. Id. at 866.
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Generally speaking, these circuits have reasoned that because
§1421 (a) gives the DHS exclusive authority to naturalize
noncitizens, the scope of judicial review under § 1421 (c) and
1447(b) cannot exceed the DHS's authority to make naturalization
decisions.'''" Thus, because § 1429 prevents the DHS from
considering the applications of persons in removal proceedings, it
must also limit courts' ability to review the DHS's actions
concerning these applications.
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit court to directly confront this
issue in iMyed v. United States.^"*^ In that case, the INS denied Ms.
Zayed's application for citizenship, stating that she lacked "good
moral character."'*^ After exhausting administrative remedies, Ms.
Zayed filed a claim for judicial review.''*'' A few weeks later, the INS
initiated removal proceedings against her and simultaneously filed a
motion in the district court to dismiss the review of the
naturalization decision, claiming that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because of the pending removal proceedings.^**
The district court accepted the government's argument and
dismissed Ms. Zayed's petition.'''^
Upon review, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's
logic, observing that nothing in § 1429 had any bearing on the
courts' subject matter jurisdiction under § 1421 (c).''*® However, the
court reasoned that if the DHS could not consider applications for
citizenship, then the court could not by "judicial fiat" compel the
Under this reasoning, the mootness test might appear to apply only when the DHS
initiates removal proceedings after the petitioner filed his claim for review. The
court explained, however, that even if the DHS had initiated removal proceedings
beforehand, it still would have dismissed the matter, but on different grounds; lack
of standing. Id. at 866 n.8. To have standing, a petitioner must present a claim that
the court can redress. See id. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that a court would not have
been able to redress the claim because removal proceedings were pending. See id.
Just after Awe, Judge Easterbrook criticized the Tenth Circuit's mootness approach
by observing that parallel civil proceedings often proceed simultaneously without
raising mootness concerns until one is finally settled. Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d
666, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2012). He noted, for example, that the same controversy can
often be fought simultaneously in state and federal court or in different federal
district courts, and neither proceeding moots the other until one of them reaches
judgment. Id. Consequently, in his view, a noncitizen who was locked in an ongoing
controversy over her removal proceedings could initiate a parallel proceeding in
federal district court over the same matter without it being mooted. Id.
140. See, e.g, Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906.
141. 368 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2004).
142. Id. at 904. "[G]ood moral character" is one of the requirements of
naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012); seesupranote 85.
143. Zayed, 368 E.3d at 904.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 906 (citing Grewal v. Ashcroft, 301 E. Supp. 2d 692, 696 (N.D. Ohio 2004) ).
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Attorney General to naturalize a person.'*' The court stressed that
Congress passed § 1429 to give priority to removal proceedings
over naturalization proceedings and it was "aware of no
suggestion that Congress intended th[is] priority . . . to be
altered by the 1990 amendments."'**
The court further noted in dictum that had the Agency initiated
removal proceedings prior to making a determination on Ms. Zayed's
application and denied the application based on the pending
removal proceedings, the district court would also have been
prohibited from granting a remedy, but for different reasons.'*^ The
court observed that when the Department denies an application, 8
U.S.C. § 1421 (c) only permits review "of such denial."'^" The court
interpreted this to mean that district courts could only review the
reasons the Department denied the application.'"'' If the denial had
been premised upon the pendency of removal proceedings, the court
would be limited to determining whether the noncitizen was, in fact,
in removal proceedings.'^^ It would not be able to proceed to the
merits of the application.'^^
Only months after the Zayed decision, the Ninth Circuit was
confronted with exactly this situation in De Lara Bellajaro v.
147. Id. at 906 & n.5 ("Tbis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance tbereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of tbe Land . . . ."
(quoting U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2)).
148. Id. at 905-06. Tbe court also reasoned tbat a declaration of prima facie
eligibility would be futile. Id. at 906-07 (distinguishing Gatcliffe v. Reno, 23 F. Supp.
2d 581, 583, 585 (D.V.I. 1998), in which the court granted tbis form of relief).
According to the court in Zayed, such a declaration could only be used in an 8
C.F.R. § 1239.2 (f) hearing to terminate removal proceedings. Id. at 907. However,
that regulation only authorized termination of removal proceedings to permit the
DHS to consider a noncitizen's pending application for citizenship. 8 C.F.R.
§ 12.39.2(f) (2013) ("An immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings to
permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending application or petition for
naturalization " (emphasis added)); see Zayed, 368 F.3d at 907. The DHS had
already denied Ms. Zayed's application, so tbe court reasoned sbe no longer had one
pending for the DHS to consider. Zayed, 368 F.3d at 907. Thus, the court concluded
that tbe IJ would not have had authority to use the court's declaration of her prima
facie eligibility to terminate removal proceedings. Id. Tbe court apparently did not
consider that Ms. Zayed could have filed another naturalization application in the
interim before seeking a hearing before an IJ.
149. Zâ yed, 368 F.3d at 907.
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (c) (2012) ; Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906.
151. Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906.
152. See id. ("Where the INS has denied an application for naturalization on the
ground that removal proceedings are pending, therefore, the district court's de novo
review is limited to review of that threshold determination."). For a critique of this
reasoning, see infra text accompanying notes 342-351.
153. Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906. But see Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 93 F. App'x 469, 471-72
(3d Cir. 2004) ("[District courts] may review denials of naturalization petitions,
without regard to the basis for tbe denial." (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (c))).
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}^''^—a denial based on the pendency of removal proceedings.
In that case. De Lara Bellajaro filed two applications. The INS
denied the first, claiming he failed to establish good moral character,
and commenced removal proceedings.'''"' De Lara Bellajaro then
filed another application for naturalization with the INS and
moved to terminate the removal proceedings.'^^ The motion was
denied and De Lara Bellajaro sought review from the district court
on the merits of his application—asking the court for an order
granting his naturalization or, in the alternative, a declaration that
he was prima facie eligible to naturalize but for the pending
removal proceedings.'"
Following the Zayed reasoning, the Ninth Circuit determined that it
could not review the merits of the application because 8 U.S.C.
§ 1421 (c) only permitted review of "such denial."'̂ ** Thus, the court
was limited to the threshold determination of whether De Lara
Bellajaro was, in fact, in removal proceedings.'"''' De Lara Bellajaro
was therefore precluded from having his application reconsidered.'^
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit decided it could not issue a
declaration of prima facie eligibility because such a declaration would
be "purely advisory."'^' Even though Acosta Hidalgo had not yet been
decided, and Cruz would presumably have allowed such a declaration
to satisfy' 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f), the court reasoned that Cruz was
154. 378 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004).
155. /d. at 1044.
156. Id.
157. De Lara Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1043-44.
158. Id. at 1046-47.
159. Id. at 1047.
160. See ¿á. at 1043-44.
161. Id. at 1047; accord Avre v. Napolitano, 494 F. App'x, 860, 866-67 (10th Cir.
2012). Citing substantial authority, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts recently made a similar argument. Ka Lok Lau v. Holder , 880 F.
Supp. 2d 276, 280-81 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a) (2006); Hewitt v.
Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987); Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,
273 (1941)) (noting that courts can only issue declaratory judgments when they
affect the behavior of the parties to a current controversy within the court's
jurisdiction, not a hypothetical future controversy). However, in Ka Lok Lau, the
court apparently only considered that the noncitizen might use this declaration to
supplement a future application determination. Id. at 282. It seemed unaware that
the declaration might be useful to terminate the pending removal proceedings
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f). See id. at 281-82 ("[I]n order for declaratory relief
to have any effect, the court must work with the hypothesis that Lau will not be
removed. . . . Because the effectiveness of the desired relief in this case hinges upon
the outcome of removal proceedings, there is no real and substantial controversy,
which is a necessity for declaratory judgment."); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2013)
(stating that an immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings upon the
establishment of prima facie eligibility for naturalization).
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probably no longer valid. "'̂  Congress had chosen to confer authority
to naturalize on the administrative agency (previously the INS and
now the DHS) and not the courts; thus, according to the Ninth
Circuit, courts could not make prima facie eligibility
determinations.'®^ The court further concluded that in any case, only
Congress, not the BIA, could expand the courts' scope of review.'®*
Therefore, according to the court, the BIA in Cruz could not give the
courts the power to make prima facie eligibility determinations when
Congress had limited their ability to do so.'®
b. The DHS's self-application of 8 U.S.C. § 1429
Notwithstanding § 1429, the DHS does in fact often consider and
make final determinations on applications while removal proceedings
are pending.'®® In these situations, the DHS has objected to
judicial review of its decisions by still claiming that § 1429 prevents
the court from reviewing the denial while removal proceedings are
pending—even though § 1429 only explicitly refers to the DHS,
not the courts.'®'
Courts seem to invalidate the DHS's violative adjudication only
when the DHS requests that they do so. For example, in Saba-Bakare
V. Chertoff^^ the DHS considered and denied Mr. Saba-Bakare's
application while he was in removal proceedings.'®^ This allowed Mr.
Saba-Bakare to file a petition for judicial review under § 1421 (c).""
The DHS, realizing the mistake it made, informed Mr. Saba-Bakare
162. De Lara Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1047 (declining to directly overturn Cruz, but
noting that it was decided prior to the 1990 statutory change through which
Congress took naturalization authority away from district courts and granted it solely
to the Attorney General (now the DHS)); aecoráZayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902,
907 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004).
163. De Lara Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1047; accord Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906-07.
164. De Lara Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1047.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2009); Saba-
Bakare V. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 2007); Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 93 F.
App'x 469, 471-72 (3d Cir. 2004); Tellez v. INS, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1360 (CD. Cal.
2000); Gatcliffe v. Reno, 23 F. Supp. 2d 581, 582 (D.V.I. 1998); Mosleh v. Strapp, 992
F. Supp. 874, 876 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
167. See, e.g., Apokarina, 93 F. App'x at 471-72; see also 8 U.S.C § 1429 (2012)
(referencing, on its face, "the Attorney General"); supra notes 107-114 and
accompanying text (explaining how, since 2003, the prohibition in § 1429 has been
shifted from the Attorney General to the DHS).
168. 507 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2007).
169. Id. at 338-39. As explained above, supra text accompanying notes 120-127,
USCIS (an agency within the DHS) reviews applications, and ICE (also an agency
within the DHS) initiates removal proceedings. For simplicity, "the DHS" is
referenced consistently throughout this Comment as carrying out both functions
except when the specific agency is particularly relevant.
170. See Saba-Bakare, 507 F.3d at 339.
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that it did not have the authority to make the determination it made
under § 1429 and reopened his naturalization application.'^' The
district court agreed that the DHS did not have this authority and
vacated the DHS's original denial.''" The court then held that it no
longer had jurisdiction to review Mr. Saba-Bakare's application under
§ 1421 (c) because there was no longer a "denial" that triggered its
jurisdiction.'^-' The Fifth Circuit affirmed.'̂ *
2. Courts that have held that district courts can provide a remedy while
removal proceedings are pending
Contrary to the five circuit courts described above, the U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Circuits recently concluded
that district courts reviewing naturalization applications can still grant
relief even while removal proceedings are pending against the
applicant.''"^ These holdings build upon several district court
opinions, some of which have held that they can even order the DHS
to naturalize applicants in removal proceedings.'™
Ngwana v. Attorney General,^^^ one of the first cases to rule in favor of
granting relief, asserted the most expansive powers for the courts and
influenced later cases in other jurisdictions. In that case, the district
court concluded that it could order the INS to naturalize an
applicant based on a plain reading of the statutes and on policy
concerns over ruling otherwise.''** After the INS denied Mr.
Ngwana's naturalization application and initiated removal
proceedings against him, he sought review of the denial under 8
U.S.C. § 1421 (c).'̂ ®
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 339-40.
174. Id. at 341-42.
175. See Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2012); Gonzalez v. Sec'y
of DHS, 678 F..3d 254, 258 (3d Cir. 2012).
176. Gonzalez v. Napolitano, 684 F. Supp. 2d 555, 564 (D.NJ. 2010), affd on other
grounds, 678 F.3d 254; Kestelboym v. Chertoff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (D.NJ.
2008); Ngwana v. Au'y Gen., 40 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321-22 (D. Md. 1999).
177. 40F. Supp. 2d 319 (D.Md. 1999).
178. See id. at 321-22; accoid Gonzalez, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 560. However, the Fourth
Circuit, which has appellate Jurisdiction over the U.S. District Court for the District
of Maryland, subsequently stated in dictum that district courts cannot grant any
remedy to applicants in removal proceedings. Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801,
805-06 (4th Cir. 2010); see supra note 139 (explaining why this statement was
dictum). However, as dictum, this statement does not bind courts in the Fourth
Circuit's Jurisdiction. See supra note 125 (noting that dicta is not binding on
subsequent cases).
179. Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 319-20.
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The court determined that § 1429 did not affect its power to grant
relief.'̂ " It first observed that nothing in the text of § 1429 referred
to judicial review."" The court also noted that § 1429 actually
provided two subtly distinct prohibitions, each directed at
different classes of noncitizens: the first prohibition was directed
at those who had final orders of removal issued against them—
those noncitizens could not be naturalized under any
circumstances.'**^ The second was directed at those who had
removal proceedings still pending—they could not have their
naturalization applications considered by theDHS.^^^
Because there was no final order of removal issued against Mr.
Ngwana, the court observed that § 1429 only prevented the INS from
"considering" Mr. Ngwana's application; the statute did not prevent
the court from complying with an order to naturalize.'*''' Considering
an application involved pondering its merits, whereas complying with
an order to naturalize would not require such an act.'®^ Thus,
according to the court, an order to naturalize would not be the same
as an order to consider Mr. Ngwana's application, which would
violate § 1429.'**®
Most crucial to the court's reasoning, however, was its concern that
holding otherwise would allow the INS to "effectively circumvent the
congressionally mandated de novo judicial review of naturalization
decisions simply by initiating removal proceedings."'**^ The court
noted that if a final order of removal was issued, review of that order
would be "extremely limited."'*^ In such circumstances, Mr. Ngwana
would need to first appeal to the BIA and, if unsuccessful, appeal
180. /á. at 321-22.
181. Id. at 321 (noting that the text of the statute only refers to the Attorney
General and the INS and therefore is not relevant to district court jurisdiction).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. M at 322.
185. See id. at 321-22; accord Gonzalez v. Napolitano, 684 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561-64
(D.NJ. 2010) (elaborating that Congress's use of "consider" in § 1429 does not
impede on a court's authority to order the Attorney General to naturalize the
applicant), affd on other grounds, 678 E.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
186. Ngwana, 40 E. Supp. 2d at 322. Eurthermore, the court reasoned that the
prohibition against the INS's considering his application was also irrelevant when, as
in Mr. Ngwana's case, the application had already been rejected and there was
nothing pending. See id. Thus, the statute would not prevent enforcement of a court
order overturning the Department's decision. See id.
187. Id. at 321-22; accord Kestelboym v. Chertoff, 538 E. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (D.NJ.
2008) ("If this Court were to read the statute as Defendants suggest. Congress's grant
of jurisdiction to the district courts to review the denial of naturalization applications
would be effectively rendered void. The Attorney General could then trump all
applications for naturalization by simply instituting removal proceedings.").
188. Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
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directly to a U.S. court of appeals.'*^ By statute, circuit courts are
required to review a removal appeal based only on the administrative
record, without taking additional evidence, and accepting
administrative findings of fact as "conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary."''*" The
court in Ngwana determined that allowing the applicant only this type
of review over his naturalization application would deprive him of his
statutory right to de novo review under § 1421 (c) .'̂ '
The Third and Seventh Circuits have effectively rejected the
Ngwana court's holding that district courts can order the INS (now
the DHS) to naturalize a noncitizen in removal proceedings. Yet
both circuit courts have determined that district courts can award
declaratory relief to the applicant.'^^ In Conzalez v. Secretary ofDHS,^^^
the Third Circuit conceived of this judgment as a declaration of an
applicant's prima facie eligibility for naturalization.'^* The court
stated that this declaration should provide sufficient basis for an IJ to
terminate removal proceedings against the applicant, regardless of
the BIA's interpretation of § 1239.2(f).''̂ ^ The Third Circuit dismissed
the reasoning in Acosta Hidalgo requiring declarations of prima facie
eligibility to come fi^om the DHS, stating, "We are confident that the BIA
would also accept the declaration of a district cotirt properly exercising its
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (c)."'»«
The Third Circuit further reasoned that declaratory relief
harmonized the relevant statutes by allowing for judicial review of
naturalization applications and not upsetting the priority given to
189. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15 (2013) (authorizing the BIA to review an IJ's decision).
190. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012); ieeNgwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (invoking
this provision).
191. See Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 322. After denying the government's motion to
dismiss, the court ultimately declared Mr. Ngwana eligible for naturalization.
Ngwana v. Att'y Gen., No. 8:98-cv-03479-AW (D. Md. Feb. 1, 2000) (Bloomberg Law,
Dockets) (granting Ngwana's appeal and remanding witb instructions to grant bis
naturalization application); êe Skype Interview with Albert Agha Ngwana, Pro Se
Litigant (Jan. 13, 2012) (notes on file with author). The INS then terminated
removal proceedings and naturalized him. See Skype Interview with Albert Agba
Ngwana, supra.
192. See Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2012); Gonzalez v.
Sec'y of DHS, 678 F.3d. 254, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2012).
193. 678 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
194. M at 260-61.
195. Id. at 260.
196. Id. Tbe court also noted, however, that even if the BIA would not accept
such a declaration to terminate removal proceedings, the declaration would still
supplement the record for removal proceedings. Id. Ultimately, the court affirmed
the DHS's denial of the application on the merits, leaving unanswered how an IJ
would have bandied sucb a declaration in light of Hidalgo. Id. at 264. For the
practical effect of such judgments when courts have isstied them, see infra notes 209-
210 and accompanying text.
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removal proceedings or the DHS's sole authority to naturalize.'^' By
granting declaratory relief, the court reasoned that district courts
would merely be supplementing the record for future
administrative decisions concerning the noncitizen's pursuit of
citizenship.'̂ ** Thus, the court held that declaratory relief would
not exceed the district courts' authority, as would be the case if
federal judges either terminated removal proceedings or
naturalized noncitizens themselves.'̂ '*
Similar to Gonzalez, the Seventh Circuit in Klene v. Napolitan(^°°
ignored the BL\'s interpretation of § 1239.2(f) from Acosta Hidalgo,
yet the court contemplated declaratory relief in an entirely different
way.̂ "' In Klene, the DHS had initiated removal proceedings against a
noncitizen to whom the Department had also denied naturalization
after finding that her marriage to a U.S. citizen was fraudulent.^°^
Chief Judge Easterbrook, who wrote the court's opinion, concluded
that the district court could declare that the applicant's marriage was,
in fact, valid for purposes of reviewing her naturalization
application.^"'' He reasoned that this declaration concerning her
marriage would have preclusive effect over the marriage's validity in
all future removal proceedings or naturalization decisions.̂ "*
Because doubt over whether the marriage was bona fide motivated
both the DHS's denial of the naturalization application and its
initiation of the removal proceedings. Judge Easterbrook reasoned
that such a declaration would, as a matter of course, resolve both the
removal proceedings and the naturalization application denial.̂ "^
In sum, the courts in Ngwana, Gonzalez, and Klene suggested three
different options for relieL The Maryland District Court in Ngwana
contended that courts could order the DHS to naturalize the
applicant.̂ "*^ The Third Circuit in Gonzalez stated that district courts
could declare that a noncitizen is prima facie eligible for
naturalization.'^"' Finally, in Klene, the Seventh Circuit asserted that
197. Gonzafez, 678 F.3d at 259-60.
198. /d. at 261.
199. /d. at 259-60.
200. 697 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2012).
201. M a t 668-69.
202. Id. at 667.
203. Id. at 669.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Ngwana v. Att'y Gen., 40 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (D. Md. 1999).
207. Gonzalez v. Sec'y of DHS, 678 F.3d 254, 258 (3d Cir. 2012).
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courts could decide some question of fact that would have an issue-
preclusive effect on all subsequent proceedings.^"^
3. The legal effect of declaratory relief
Even if relief were granted under the preceding theories, it is
difficult to know precisely what legal effect the relief would have.
When courts have rendered decisions in favor of noncitizens'
naturalization appeals, the INS (now the DHS) has typically
responded by terminating removal proceedings and naturalizing the
applicant, rather than resisting the court order.̂ "^ In doing so, the
government appears to be avoiding unfavorable precedent, which
could result if the matter were challenged further.^'" Thus, as a
practical matter, court-ordered remedies have a significant impact,
though little or no case law is available to gauge its legal influence.
The BIA's decision in Acosta Hidalgo suggests that even a court-
issued declaration of prima facie eligibility cannot be used by an IJ to
terminate removal proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f).^"
Furthermore, even if an IJ did terminate removal proceedings, 8
U.S.C. § 1429 states that the findings made in a decision to terminate
removal proceedings "shall not be deemed binding in any way" on
the decision to naturalize the noncitizen.^'^ Thus, the Acosta Hidalgo
precedent conceivably might prevent a district court's declaratory
208. Klme, 697 F.3d at 669.
209. In Gatcliffe v. Reno, for example, the government appealed the district court's
judgment declaring the applicant to have good moral character and be "fully
qualified for naturalization." Gatcliffe v. Reno, 23 F. Supp. 2d. 581, 585 (D.V.I.
1998). However, it backed down, terminated removal proceedings, and naturalized
the applicant before the Third Circuit could decide the matter. Telephone Interview
with James J. Orlow, Partner, Orlow, Kaplan & Hohenstein, LLP (Jan. 3, 2012) (notes
on file with author). Additionally, in Kestleboym, the government terminated removal
proceedings and naturalized the applicant after the district court denied its motion
to dismiss. See Kestelboym v. Chertoff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (D.NJ. 2008); E-mail
from Joshua Bardavid, Principal Attorney, Bardavid Law, to author (Jan. 3, 2012,
08:54 EST) (on file with author). In Ngwana, the INS similarly responded to the
courts'judgment. Seesupranote 191 and accompanying text.
210. See E-mail from Joshua Bardavid, Principal Attorney, Bardavid Law, to
author (Jan. 3, 2012, 21:27 EST) (on file with author). Even if the Department
did continue to press the matter, it appears likely that an IJ would terminate
removal proceedings based on a court's judgment, notwithstanding Acosta
Hidalgo. See id.; see also supra note 99 (discussing courts that act without an
affirmative communication from the DHS).
211. See In re Acosta Hidalgo, 24 1. & N. Dec. 103, 105-06 (B.l.A. 2007) (asserting
that only the DHS, not federal courts, have the authority to make prima facie
declarations of eligibility for naturalization).
212. See 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (2012); see also Shewchun v. Holder, 658 F.3d 557, 565
(6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that although the DHS may not consider naturalization
applications, the Department may make prima facie eligibility determinations
because such decisions are not binding on later consideration of the application
under §1429).
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judgment from having any effect on either the removal proceedings or
the naturalization determination if the DHS resists implementing it.
Even if Acosta Hidalgo is not legally controlling, it has had a
chilling effect on courts' willingness to provide remedies. In
Barnes v. Holder,'^^^ the Fourth Circuit relied on Acosta Hidalgo to
conclude, in dictum, that district courts could not grant any
remedy to applicants in removal proceedings.^'* In addition, as
previously addressed, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits both denied
declaratory relief even before Acosta Hidalgo because they
predicted that a judicial declaration could no longer be used to
terminate removal proceedings.^'^
Furthermore, six circuit courts of appeals—the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth—have all upheld the central holding
in Acosta Hidalgo that IJs cannot make prima facie eligibility
declarations themselves. Reasoning that the BIA's decision in Acosta
Hidalgo was an agency's interpretation of its own regulation, courts
have generally granted the decision Chevron deference,̂ '*" declaring
that the BIA's holding could only be overturned if it was "arbitrary,
capricious," or "plainly erroneous []or inconsistent with the
[regulation]."^'^ Generally speaking, these courts concluded that
213. 625 F.3d 801 (4th Cir. 2010).
214. See id. at 805-06 (deferring to BIA decisions as a gap-filler in interpreting
regulations, and asserting that only the DHS has the authority to make prima facie
determinations of naturalization for use in removal proceedings); êe also Awe v.
Napolitano, 494 F. App'x 860, 867 n.9 (10th Cir. 2012) (observing, "without
expressing an opinion on the matter," that the BIA in Acosta Hidalgo denied district
courts the authority to declare prima facie eligibility).
215. See supra note 162 (explaining how naturalization authority was shifted from
the district courts to the Attorney General (now DHS)).
216. In Cheurón, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the Supreme Court articulated its famous framework for courts to employ
when evaluating an agency's construction of a statute. This analysis, which has
become known as Chevron deference, requires the court to defer to the agency and
uphold any reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Id. at 843-44. An
interpretation is reasonable unless it is "arbitraiy, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute." Id. at 844; see also Linda D. Jellum, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose:
Reconciling hiovm v. Gardner's Presumption that Interpretive Doubt Be Resolved in Veterans'
Favor with Chevron, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 70-72 (2011 ) (describing Chevron deference
in greater detail).
217. E.g., Shewchun, 658 F.3d at 563; Barnes, 625 F.3d at 804, 808; Ogunfuye v.
Holder, 610 F.3d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 2010); Zegrean v. Att'y Gen., 602 F.3d 273,
275 (3d Cir. 2010); Perriello v. Napohtano, 579 F.3d 135, 138, 142 (2d Cir.
2009); Hernandez de Anderson v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2007).
See generally Aner v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (illustrating the Supreme
Court's adherence to this deferential standard in reviewing administrative
regulations).
The Third Circuit's upholding of Acosta Hidalgo in Zegrean is interesting in light of
its later explicit disregard of it in Gonzalez. See supra note 196. Zegrean, however, dealt
with a petitioner who was seeking a prima facie eligibility declaration from an IJ, not
from the court itself. Zegrean, 602 F.3d at 275. (This was also the situation in each of
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Acosta Hidalgo withstood the plainly erroneous test because Congress
had transferred to the DHS the authority to naturalize; thus, it was
not plainly erroneous to require that prima facie naturalization
eligibility determinations come from the DHS.̂ '̂  The Ninth Circuit
further reasoned that Acosta Hidalgo promoted judicial efficiency
because if the DHS was unwilling to declare an applicant's prima
facie eligibility for purposes of removal proceedings, the Department
would eventually most likely deny the applicant's naturalization
application anyway.'•̂ ''̂
Several courts also wrestled with how the DHS could even make
prima facie naturalization determinations when § 1429 prohibits it
from considering such applications while the applicant is in removal
proceedings. In Shewchun v. Holder'^^ and Barnes v. Holder, the Sixth
and Fourth Circuits, respectively, concluded that because 8 C.F.R.
§ 1239.2(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1429 must be read harmoniously, the
DHS simply must be able to make prima facie eligibility
determinations without violating § 1429, even if there was no
compelling explanation for how.̂ '̂ The Fourth Circuit
additionally relied on the government's attorney's statement at
oral arguments that the DHS could, and in fact did, make such
determinations without violating § 1429.̂ ^̂
In Perriello v. Napolitano,'^^ however, the DHS took the opposite
position, claiming it could not make a prima facie eligibility
determination.^^'' In that case, the INS put Mr. Perriello in removal
proceedings after discovering he had been convicted of a crime
twenty-three years prior.̂ "̂̂  Mr. Perriello then filed an application for
the cases listed above with the exceptions of Barnes.) Also, Zegrean was decided by
three entirely different judges than Gonzalez. Compare Gonzalez v. Sec'y of DHS, 678
F.3d 254, 255 (3d Cir. 2012) (Judges Fuentes, Chaagares, and Pogue), with Zegrean,
602 F.3d at 274 (Judges Barry, Jordan, and Van Antwerpen). One way to reconcile
Zegrean and Gonzalez would be to say that the Third Circuit upheld the portion of
Acosta Hidalgo that prohibits IJs from making prima facie eligibility determinations
but not the case's dictum statement that courts are also prohibited from making
these determinations.
218. E.g, Perriello, 579 F.3d at 142.
219. Hernandez de Anderson, 497 F.3d at 935.
220. 658 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2011).
221. Id. at 564-65; Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 807 (4th Cir. 2010).
222. Bames, 625 F.3d at 807 & n.4 (noting that nothing requires the DHS to
consider a noncitizen's application while detennining prima facie eligibility, nor
does anything prevent a noncitizen from supplying additional evidence of prima
facie ehgibility that was not in her application); êe infra note 448 (critiquing the
court's conclusion that the DHS could lawfully make such prima facie eligibility
determinations because it regularly did make them in practice).
223. 579 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2009).
224. 7d. atl42.
225. Id. at 137.
2013] CHECKING THE DHS 531
naturalization and moved to terminate removal proceedings.^^'' The
IJ, following Acosta Hidalgo, denied the motion, and the BIA affirmed
because the INS had not stated he was prima facie eligible for
naturalization.^'^' When Mr. Perriello appealed to the district court,
the Agency (by then the DHS) claimed that it could not have even
made such a determination because § 1429 prevented it from
considering Mr. Perriello's application while removal proceedings
were pending.̂ '̂ *
The Second Circuit agreed with the DHS's argument, finding that
8 U.S.C. § 1429 prevented the Department from making a prima facie
eligibility determination for the purposes of terminating removal
proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f)."^^ Furthermore, because
§ 1429 prevented the DHS from acting, the statute also precluded
the court from making such a determination—the court's ability to
grant relief could not be greater than the DHS's.̂ ^" The court
then reasoned that IJs could not make a prima facie eligibility
determination because "it would be odd" to give IJs this power
when the DHS and the district courts were barred from making
the determination.^'"
Consequently, the Second Circuit determined that § 1239.2(f) was
inconsistent with § 1429.̂ ^̂  Nonetheless, the court held that it was
not in a position to remedy the confiict because "it is not a judicial
role to save a regulation that now conflicts . . . with the underlying
statute."^^^ Because the Acosta Hidalgo interpretation was "neither
plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the regulation," the court
226. Id.
227. See ¿d. at 137-38.
228. See id. at 141. In this case, the DHS's position on § 1429 appears to conflict
not only with its stance in other cases but also with its treatment of Mr. Perriello's
application. Even though the DHS in Perriello claimed § 1429 prevented it from
determining Mr. Perriello's prima facie eligibility for tbe purposes of terminating
removal proceedings, it had nonetheless adjudicated his application and denied it
despite the pendency of removal proceedings. See id. at 140-41. It is not clear how
§ 1429's bar on considering applications could prevent the DHS from determining
his prima facie eligibility but not prevent it from conducting a full adjudication on
his application. For other examples of the DHS's consideration of applications
despite the prohibition in § 1429, see .supraPart l.C.I.b.
229. Perriello, 579 F.3d at 138, 142; accmd Zegrean v. Att'y Gen., 602 F.3d 273, 274
(3rd Cir. 2010).
230. Perriello, 579 F.3d at 142. The court's reasoning was based on its
previous holding in Ajlani, which was substantially the same as the Sixth
Circuit's holding in Zayed. See supra notes 141-153 and accompanying text
(discussing this case history).
231. Perriello, 579 F.3d at 142.
232. Id. at 140 & n.6.
233. Id. at 142.
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concluded that it was up to either Congress or the DHS to remedy
the "considerable confusion. "̂ '̂'
Thus, because courts have been unwilling to directly overrule
Acosta Hidalgo, many have also declined to declare an applicant's
prima facie eligibility. Under Acosta Hidalgo, such a declaration
would have no legal effect on the decision of whether to terminate
removal proceedings.
4. Courts ' handling of due process claims
Although some petitioners have attempted due process claims,
courts have only given scant attention to these arguments and have
rejected them under the plenary power doctrine.̂ ^^ For example, in
Hernandez de Anderson v. Gonzale^^^ and Shewchun v. Holder, the
petitioners objected that their due process rights were violated by the
DHS's power to initiate removal proceedings, to unilaterally prevent
termination of removal proceedings, to deny applications based on
the pendency of removal proceedings, and to issue a final order of
removal.^ '̂ However, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits decided that
giving the DHS these powers was consistent with Congress's
plenary power over immigration.'̂ '''* Furthermore, in both Barnes
and Shewchun, the Fifth Circuit and Sixth Circuit, respectively,
reasoned that because § 1239.2 (f) was promulgated at the
Department's discretion—in that the DHS was not constitutionally
or statutorily required to promulgate it—the DHS had the
authority to limit its application.^^^
II. INTERPRETING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS TO PRECLUDE
JUDicL\L REVIEW OF NATURALIZATION APPLICATIONS WHEN THE
APPLICANTS ARE IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS VIOLATES PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS
Although courts' ability to directly protect substantive rights in the
immigration context is extremely limited under the plenary power
234. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
235. See generally Motomura, supra note 1, at 1626 (describing "[t]he stunted
growth of constitutional immigration law"); Motomura, supra note 4, at 566 (noting
"the cavalier treatment of constitutional claims in immigration law").
236. 497 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2007).
237. See Shewchun v. Holder, 658 F.3d 557, 562-^5 (6th Cir. 2011); Hernandez de
Anderson, 497 F.Sd at 935.
238. Shewchun, 658 F.3d at 563; Hernandez de Anderson, 497 F.3d at 935 (noting that
the petitioner provided no case law to support a due process claim).
239. See Shewchun, 658 F.3d at 565; Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 807 n.3 (4th Cir.
2010) ; ieg also infra text accompanying notes 302-303 (criüqtúng this reasoning).
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doctrine, the scope of the DHS's discretion under these rulings
nevertheless raises important substantive concerns. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly acknowledged the drastic consequences of
deportation and has required significant protections before such an
action can be carried out.̂ "*" Under the dominant interpretation of
these statutes and regulations, however, removal proceedings have
become a litigation tactic for avoiding review of the DHS's naturalization
decisions.̂ "" In the process, removal proceedings strip noncitizens of
the protections of having an independent review of both the
proceedings themselves and of their naturalization application.̂ ''̂
This Part analyzes these substantive concerns indirectly through a
procedural due process argument while also advancing a procedural
surrogate vehicle for protecting these substantive concerns.̂ *^
Applying a procedural surrogate in this situation should not be
difficult. The power to place people in removal proceedings is
probably more so a procedural power than a substantive one.-''*
Additionally, courts should be especially open to applying the
procedural due process exception to naturalization applicants in
removal proceedings. As previously noted, courts have historically
emphasized that noncitizens facing deportation have procedural due
process rights.̂ *^ Because of people's location inside the United
States, those facing deportation fall more so under the Constitution's
protection and theoretically have stronger ties to the country.̂ *®
This Part applies the due process exception through three steps.
First, it demonstrates that the combined effect of the relevant statutes
240. See, e.g, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (describing deportation as "a life sentence of banishment"); Ng Fung Ho
V. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that deportation "may result... in loss . . .
of all that makes life worth living"); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740
(1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away
from home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent across
the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and
cruel."); see also supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (describing the
heightened protections afforded to noncitizens facing deportation, particularly
injustice Douglas's opinions).
241. See infra text accompanying notes 255-264 (arguing that the DHS may initiate
removal proceedings to zealously defend itself after a noncitizen files a claim for
Judicial review).
242. See infra Part ILA (outlining how current statutes, regulations, case law, and
DHS practices combine to prevent noncitizens from seeking judicial review when the
Department denies naturalization applications).
243. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (discussing procedural surrogates).
244. See infra Part Il.B.
245. See supra Part I.A.I (tracing tbe evolution of the procedural due process
exception as related to deportation cases).
246. See supra note 51 (outlining cases that distinguish between rights of
noncitizens inside the United States and rights of noncitizens seeking to enter the
United States and pointing out the fallacies in this distinction).
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confers a distinct power on the DHS—namely, a mechanism for
denying applicants access to judicial review. Second, it explains why
this power is more procedural than substantive in nature, which
makes the procedural due process exception potentially applicable.
Finally, it analyzes this power under the test for procedural due
process violations.
A. If the Majority of Courts Interpreting 8 U.S. C. § 1429 and 8 C.F.R.
§ 1239.2(f)Are Correct, the DHS Has a Mechanism for
Denying Judicial Review
In many ways, the DHS's powers under 8 U.S.C. § 1429 and 8
C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) present the same conflicts as were at issue in
Nagahi. In Nagahi, the Tenth Circuit held that the INS (now the
DHS) could not place limitations on the availability of judicial
review.̂ *^ In contrast, the current interpretations of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1429 and 8 C.E.R. § 1239.2(f) give the DHS the authority to do
exactly that.̂ *^
As explained above, many circuit courts have interpreted 8 U.S.C.
§ 1429 to strip district courts of the ability to grant any meaningful
remedy when reviewing the DHS naturalization determinations while
the applicant is in removal proceedings.̂ *® Eurthermore, many
circuits have upheld the BIA's interpretation of 8 C.E.R. § 1239.2(f),
which places a necessary element for terminating removal
proceedings entirely at the DHS's discretion.̂ ^^ Thus, by placing a
person in removal proceedings, the DHS can unilaterally avoid
judicial review of its naturalization determinations.^^' When taken
together, 8 U.S.C. § 1429 and 8 C.E.R. § 1239.2 (f) provide the DHS a
mechanism whereby it can strip judicial review.
247. Nagahi v. INS, 219 F.3d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 2000); see supra notes 72-76
and accompanying text (illustrating how the court in Nagahi combined statutes and
regulations to limit Judicial review when the INS places a time restriction on filing a
petition for review).
248. See supra Part I.C.I, 3 (explaining how courts have created this situation).
249. See supra Part LC. 1 .a.
250. See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text (describing courts that have
applied deferential review to uphold the BIA's interpretation). Even worse, some
courts have determined that determining prima facie eligibility is outside even the
DHS's discretion. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
251. S«« supra Part I.C.I, 3 (outlining the legal interpretations of statutes and
regulations that prevent noncitizens from seeking Judicial review of naturalization
applications when the noncitizen is in removal proceedings).
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However, on their faces, 8 U.S.C. § 1429 and 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f)
appear to be different from the regulation at issue in Nagahi^^^ First,
unlike the regulation in Nagahi, the decision to initiate removal
proceedings by the DHS is not a direct attack on Judicial review.̂ ^̂
Ostensibly, the DHS's decision must be a determination that the
noncitizen is harmful to the national Community.̂ ""*
Many cases seem to indicate, however, that the DHS uses
deportation as a litigation tool for battling a noncitizen's claim for
judicial review. In several cases, the DHS did not initiate removal
proceedings until after the applicant had filed a claim for judicial
review.̂ ""̂  In Kestelboym v. Chertoff,^^^ for example, the DHS did not
initiate removal proceedings until six days before its answer to
the petitioner's complaint was due.^^' Furthermore, in an
adversarial legal system, the government will presumably use any
252. See generally supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing that the
regulation limited the time period in which a noncitizen could file a claim for
judicial review).
253. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (requiring the initiation of removal
proceedings only when the noncitizen meets certain characteristics), with 8 C.F.R.
§ 336.9(b) (requiring petitioners for judicial review to file their claims within 120
days), and Nagahi v. INS, 219 E.3d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that this
time limit infringed on noncitizens' statutory right to judicial review).
254. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (listing the elements of deportability, which
primarily concern threats to others); iee also supra note 85 (summarizing some of
the elements of deportability).
255. See, eg, Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 667 (7th Cir. 2012); Awe v.
Napohtano, 494 F. App'x 860, 861 (10th Cir. 2012); Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d
902, 904, 907 (6th Cir. 2004); Moya de Leon v. Napoliuno, No. 10 Civ. 6176(DLC),
2011 WL 1990876, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011); Khempecth v. U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Sen-s., No. 10-2738, 2011 WL 290706, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2011);
Kestelboym v. Chertoff, 538 E. Supp. 2d 813, 814-15 (D.NJ. 2008); Grewal v.
Ashcroft, 301 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694, 696 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
Designing a rule that prevents the DHS from waiting to see whether an applicant
files a claim for review before initiating removal proceedings appears to have been
rejected by the circuit courts. Early in this debate, some courts attempted to decide
whether to grant relief based on how late in the process removal proceedings had
been initiated, citing policy concerns over letting the DHS use deportation as a
means of evading review. See, e.g., Saad v. Barrows, No. Civ. A. 3;03-CV-1342G, 2004
WL 1359165, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 16, 2004) (noting that district courts tended to
accept jurisdiction when the Department had initiated removal proceedings after
denying the petitioners' applications); Grewal, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (holding that
courts could accept jurisdiction whenever the DHS initiated removal proceedings
after the petitioner had filed a claim for review). There is littie legal basis for
drawing a line in this way. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit in Zayed held that the
timing of the removal proceedings was irrelevant. Zayed, 368 F.3d at 907. Since then,
few, if any, courts have based their decisions on the timing of the removal
proceedings. In fact, several circuits have denied review even when the DHS
initiated removal proceedings after the petitioners had filed claims for review. See,
e.g. Awe, 494 F. App'x at 861; Zayed, 368 F.3d at 904, 907.
256. 538 F. Supp. 2d 813 (D.NJ. 2008).
257. Id. at 815; iee also Khempecth, 2011 WL 290706, at *1 (noting that the DHS
commenced removal proceedings four months after the applicant filed his claim for
judicial review).
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technique it can to zealously defend itself in court.-^* There is no
reason to think that the choice to initiate removal proceedings
would be an exception. '̂̂ ^
Second, the DHS's power to cut off judicial review also appears to
be distinct from the regulation at issue in Nagahi because the DHS's
decision to initiate removal proceedings cannot be arbitrary. The
DHS must find that the noncitizen meets certain requirements to
make him or her subject to deportation.'̂ *^"
What is troubling, however, is that the bar for placing a noncitizen
in removal proceedings is low enough that the DHS can arguably
apply removal proceedings selectively—for example, when the
noncitizen seeks judicial review.̂ '̂ For instance, in Qrewal v.
Ashcrofl,^'^^ the INS denied the noncitizen's application based on three
petty misdemeanors—at least two of which had been vacated.̂ ^^ After
the noncitizen filed a claim for judicial review, the INS initiated
removal proceedings based merely on those petty crimes.'***
Thus, despite these facial differences, the DHS's power to cut off
judicial review by placing naturalization applicants in removal
proceedings is substantively similar to the regulation at issue in
Nagahi^^^ Even without proceeding to the rest of the due process
analysis, this similarity is arguably enough to end the discussion and
seek a statutory interpretation that denies the DHS such unrestrained
power.'̂ *'*' After all, the Tenth Circuit in Nagahi, concluded that to
construe statutes so as to allow an immigration agency the power to
limit a statutory grant of judicial review requires an explicit statement
by Congress.^''' The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not
258. E-mail from Joshua Bardavid, Principal Attorney, Bardavid Law, to author
(Jan. 3, 2012, 16:05 EST) (on file with author). Joshua Bardavid was the counsel for
the petitioner in Kestelboym.
259. See id. (noting that while DHS attorneys, just as other lawyers, "us[e] any and
all tools available witbin the law to succeed [, i]t is more complex . . . for DHS
attorneys because tbeir job is not supposed to be about 'winning,' but rather, about
seeing that justice is done").
260. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (providing elements necessary for a
finding of deportability). For a brief summary of these elements, see supra note 85.
261. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (explaining that
"immigration law ha[s] ma[de] removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class
of noncitizen [s]").
262. 301 F. Supp. 2d 692 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
263. M at693-94&n.l.
264. Id. at 694 (denying the government's motion to dismiss).
265. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing the regulation at
issue in Nagahi, which limited claims for judicial review of a citizenship
application denial).
266. See infra Part III.
267. Nagahi v. INS, 219 F.3d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)).
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contain any such statement. '̂'̂  To the contrary, the INA explicitly
mandates that noncitizens whose applications are denied have
access to de novo review, which is uncommonly large in scope
relative to the normal highly deferential standard for judicial
review of agency decisions.^''^
Even if Nagahi is not sufficient to end the discussion, this section
has demonstrated that the DHS possesses a mechanism for cutting off
judicial review. The next section analyzes whether that mechanism
violates due process.
B. The Department of Homeland Security's Powers To Deny Judicial Review
Are Properly Eramed as "Procedural" Rather than "Substantive"
Determining whether the DHS's power to circumvent judicial
review is a procedural or a substantive power is crucial to analyzing
whether the due process exception applies. Laws and regulations that
are substantive in nature fall within the generally unreviewable
discretion that the plenary power doctrine affords Congress and
administrative agencies.^'" In contrast, laws and regulations that are
procedural in nature potentially fall under the procedural due
process exception to the plenary power doctrine.^"
Distinguishing between substantive powers and procedural powers
is not easy. As previously discussed, one method of making the
distinction is to determine whether the relevant laws or regulations
establish categories or establish procedures to sort between
categories.^'^ Substantive laws tend to establish categories defining
what types of people are or are not entitled to certain rights, whereas
procedural powers establish a mechanism for sorting individuals
between those categories. '̂'̂  The substantive categories and
procedural sorting mechanisms can be distinguished by looking into
the basis for either conferring or denying the right.̂ ''* If the
268. See id. at 1169-70 (rejecting the INS's contention that three provisions within
the Immigration and Nationality Act provide congressionally delegated authority to
the INS to limit jtidicial review). See generally Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
(including no explicit limitation on judicial review).
269. 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (c) (2012); iee Nagahi, 219 F.3d at 1169; êe also infra notes
352-358 and accompanying text (observing the extraordinary nature of de novo
review over agency decisions).
270. See siipra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
274. See Escobar v. INS, 896 F.2d 564, 567-68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (looking at the
purpose behind a statutory provision to make this determination), withdrawn, reh'gen
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underlying basis for conferring or denying the right is something
other than terms the statute uses, then the statute is procedural.''"
Escobar v. INS^''^ provides a useful illustration of how the distinction
between a substantive and a procedural law might be made.'" In that
case. Congress required all noncitizens who married U.S. citizens
while they were in removal proceedings to live outside the United
States for two years before immigrating based on their marriage.^'^
Congress passed the statute to filter out noncitizens who entered into
"sham marriages" simply to gain lawful permanent resident status. '̂̂
Congress apparently assumed that noncitizens who married while in
removal proceedings were more likely to be in "sham marriages" than
those who married at other times.̂ *"
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit classified the statute
as procedural because it used the timing of marriages as a method of
sorting immigrants between two different substantive categories: (1)
those whose marriages were presumptively valid and who should thus
be entitled to remain in the country as immigrants, and (2) those
whose marriages were more likely "sham[s]" and thus should not be
entitled to that right.̂ *" If the statute was substantive, the categories
would have been (1) those who married while in removal
proceedings and (2) those who did
bane granted. No. 89-5037 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 1990), and appeal dismissed, vacated as
moot, 925 F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
275. See id. (holding that section 5 of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986, which provides that if a noncitizen marries a U.S. citizen
while deportation proceedings are pending, the noncitizen must leave the
country l'or two years before the INS will evaluate the marital status, "is
procedural in purpose and effect").
276. 896 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn, reh'g en bane granted. No. 89-
5037 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 1990), and appeal dismissed, vacated as moot, 925 F.2d
488 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
277. Although Escobar was later vacated and withdrawn and numerous other
circuits came to the opposite conclusion regarding the statute the court found
unconstitutional in Escobar, Judge Gesell's opinion provides a clear explanation
of how to distinguish between procedural laws and substantive laws in the
immigration context.
278. See Escobar, 896 F.2d at 566 (examining the constitutionality of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 5, 100 Stat.
3537,3543).
279. Id.; see Immigration Marriage Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration &f Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 6-10, 19
(1985) (statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Immigration & Refugee Policy) (asserting the subcommittee members' goals in
crafting the amendments).
280. Escobar, 896 F.2d at 572.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 567-68 (identifying the law as a procedural mechanism for sorting
out sham marriages from valid marriages).
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The underlying basis for conferring or denying the right to remain
in the country demonstrates that the statute at issue in Escobar was not
substantive.̂ "̂* If the underlying basis was the timing of marriage.
Congress would have been drawing a policy line indicating that
peoples' choice of when to get married made them more or less
entitled to remain in the country.̂ *** In other words, it would have
made the timing of a marriage a determinant of a noncitizen's
worthiness to remain, rather than an indicator of whether the
marriage was valid.''*''' It is much more likely that the underlying basis
for granting or denying the right to stay was the presumptive validity
of the marriage.̂ *"" Congress made the underlying substantive choice to
give priority treatment to those people who were less likely to have
entered into "sham marriages" by using the timing of marriages as a way
to gauge the marriages' vaJidit̂ .'̂ **̂  Thus, this was a procedural statute
because the timing of marriage was tised to sort people between the
presumptively valid and presumptively invalid categories of marriages.̂ ®*
Even assuming that Congress intended § 1429 to limit judicial
review, the provision seems procedural when analyzed within the
Escobar framework. Eirst, the underlying basis for conferring or
denying the rights involved determines the substantive categories.̂ ^®
Interpreting § 1429 as conferring a substantive power on the DHS
would indicate that the underlying basis for conferring or denying
review rights is whether noncitizens were in removal proceedings.̂ ®"
But this seems highly unlikely. It seems more likely that the
underlying basis is whether a person is likely to be a "good" citizen if
naturalized.'̂ ®' Whether a person is in removal proceedings is merely
a gauge for determining whether he or she is likely to be a good
citizen if naturalized, just as the timing of a person's marriage in
Escobar was a gauge for determining whether his or her marriage was
283. Id.
284. See id. (noting that the underlying concern of the statute is not the timing of





289. S«« generally supra text accompanying notes 281-288 (illustrating possible
substantive categories for a law that withheld immigration benefits based on the
timing of a noncitizen's marriage).
290. S«e generally supra text accompanying notes 281-288.
291. Cf. Escobar, 896 F.2d at 568 (explaining that the timing of the marriage
indicated the likelihood of the marriage's validity, which reflected the noncitizens'
worthiness to naturalize).
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likely to be valid.̂ ^̂  Thus, in § 1429, the pendency of removal
proceedings is merely a method for categorizing people between
those who are more likely and those who are less likely to be good
citizens, which is the real underlying basis for granting or
denying noncitizens the right to have their naturalization
applications reviewed.̂ ^^
The preceding observations lead to the conclusion that § 1429 uses
the pendency of removal proceedings as a procedural mechanism for
sorting people between two underlying substantive categories: (1)
those who are likely to be better citizens and thus should have their
naturalization applications reviewed by the DHS and, if denied, the
courts; and (2) those who are less likely to be good citizens and
thus should not have their naturalization applications reviewed by
the DHS or (under many circuits' interpretations)^^^ the courts.
Consequently, § 1429, and the DHS's powers to limit judicial
review under it, are procedural in nature and not substantive.
Accordingly, § 1429 and the DHS's powers can be scrutinized
under the procedural due process test to determine whether they
are constitutional.
C The Department of Homeland Security's Powers To Deny Judicial Review
Violates the Procedural Due Process Test
Once a government power is established as procedural, the
distinction between immigration law and mainstream public law
begins to fade. When analyzing procedural due process claims,
courts have typically applied the same two-step test in both contexts:
(1) whether the alleged interest was a liberty or property interest as
protected under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, and (2)
whether the process given was adequate. '̂'̂  The DHS's power to strip
judicial review by initiating removal proceedings violates both of
these prongs.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 285-286 (arguing that the timing of the
marriage was more likely an indicator than a determinant of the person's worthiness
to remain in the United States).
293. See supra text accompanying note 275 (explaining how laws that serve as
methods for categorizing people are procedural).
294. See supra Part I.C.I.a (outlining holdings from the Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits stating that courts cannot award relief for
challenges to naturalization denials when the noncitizen is in removal proceedings).
295. See, e.g., Escobar, 896 F.2d at 569-71 (holding that the statute that categorized
people based on the timing of their marriage violated the Due Process Clause). See
generally Motomura, supra note 1, at 1651-55 (providing examples of the procedural
due process test's application in immigration cases).
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As to the first step of the procedural due process test, the Supreme
Court has held that statutory rights are a "species of property" and
are thus entitled to due process protection.'̂ ^*' Both 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1421 (c) and 1447 (b) are statutory rights that afford applicants a
right to judicial review of their naturalization applications.^^'
Furthermore, 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) provides noncitizens an additional
administrative right to a hearing to terminate removal proceedings.^^*
Thus, these statutory and administrative rights clearly meet the test
for propert)'.
Because these rights are established as property, the DHS cannot
selectively deprive individuals of their rights under these laws without
due process as long as the laws remain in effect.'̂ '̂' Thus, to strip
these rights. Congress or the DHS would need to change the laws
through the legislative or rulemaking process and would need a
rational basis for doing so.̂ "" In other words, the DHS does not have
constitutional authority to withhold from certain noncitizens judicial
review or the ability to have removal proceedings terminated without
adequate justification and procedures for doing so.
The DHS cannot withhold these property rights even though the
Constitution did not require the DHS to grant them in the first
place.'̂ *" Even if rights are granted gratuitously, they still invoke due
process protection.'"^ Consequently, contrary to what the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits suggested in Barnes and Shewchun, the fact that an
296. See, e.g-., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431-32 (1982)
(holding that a statutory right to judicial review for terminated employees was
property and entitled them to due process protections because the holding otherwise
would allow virtually any state-created property interest to be destroyed at will); see
also Motomura, supra note 1, at 1655 (explaining tbat courts consider statutory rights
as property in the immigration context as well).
297. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(e), 1447(b) (2012); 5ee Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 E.3d 229, 236
(2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that an alien can seek de novo review of the denial of a
naturalization application under § 1421 (c) and can ask a district court to determine
or remand a matter under § 1447(b)).
298. See8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2013); Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135, 138 (2d
Cir. 2009).
299. See generally U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."
(emphasis added)).
300. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 439 (plurality opinion) ("At the minimum level, . . . the
Court 'consistently has required that legislation classify the persons it affects in a
manner rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives.'" (quoting
Scbweiker V. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981))).
301. See id. at 431-32 (majority opinion) (correcting the view that gratuitous rights
can be withheld without due process).
302. Id. at 432.
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agency used its discretion to promulgate 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (f) does not
give the DHS the prerogative to limit its application.^"^
As to the second step, the type of process due is determined by
balancing three factors: (1) the nature of the private interest that the
official action affects; (2) the risk that the procedures employed
would lead to an erroneous deprivation of that interest and the likely
value of other possible procedures that could have been added; and
(3) the government's interest in employing those procedures, taking
into account the financial or administrative burden of performing
the same function vñth added or different procedures.^"^
The DHS's exercise of power to cut off judicial review for
noncitizen naturalization applicants in removal proceedings lacks
sufficient process. First, the private interest of noncitizens is very
high. Noncitizens in removal proceedings have few options if the
DHS can block review under §§ 1421 (c) and 1447(b).-'"' They will
likely be deported from the country, a consequence that the Supreme
Court has acknowledged as severe.̂ "®
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of noncitizens' abilities
to become naturalized is high because cutting off judicial review
leaves the DHS without oversight when making naturalization
determinations.•**"' It thus becomes significantly more likely that the
DHS mistakes wdll go unremedied.
Third, allowing judicial review for noncitizens in removal
proceedings would impose only a small additional burden on the
government.''"^ To counter this point, some legislators have claimed
that the availability of judicial review is frustrating the enforcement of
immigration laws.̂ "® Those legislators cite the steep increases in the
303. See supra text accompanying note 239 (describing the courts' reasoning that
because § 1239.2(f) was promulgated at the DHS's discretion, the Department
ultimately had sole authority in determining its applicability and scope).
304. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
305. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)-(4) (2012) (denying noncitizens the right to
challenge the DHS's decision to initiate removal proceedings, and permitting only a
limited review of final orders of removal that is highly deferential to the DHS).
306. See cases cited supra note 240.
307. See generally 73A CJ.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 320 (2004)
(explaining that one of the purposes of judicial review of administrative action is to
prevent mistakes).
308. See generally Benson, supra note 124, at 405-33 (describing how the availability
of judicial review likely only plays a small part in explaining the size of the federal
court docket taken up by challenges to immigration decisions).
509. See id. (contending that the problems described by these legislators are more
complex than the availability of judicial review).
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numbers of immigrants seeking judicial review in recent years, which
have significantly taxed some circuits.^'"
However, in truth, preventing the DHS from circumventing
judicial review would only exacerbate this problem to a very limited
degree. Rather than increasing the total federal docket of
immigration matters, the availability of judicial review would only
increase the immigration docket subset that specifically involves
review of naturalization application denials and delays.'̂ "
Additionally, responding to the large volume of immigration
matters in federal courts by limiting judicial review is short-sighted
and ignores several factors that contribute to the increasing number
of cases.'̂ '̂  For example, while the number of people seeking judicial
review has increased, the number of people in removal proceedings
has also increased.""^ Naturally, a rise in the number of people faced
with removal would lead to a rise in the number of people seeking
judicial review of removal decisions.
Also, the quality of administrative adjudications may have dropped
in recent years, causing a greater number of immigrants to seek
federal court review. '̂'' The eleven members of the BIA issued 35,294
decisions in 2011.-"''' Assuming that the members each worked 220
days in the year,̂ '® each member produced roughly 14.58 decisions
per day.'̂ " Therefore, if all BIA members spent the entire eight-
hour workday deciding cases, each member would have decided
decide roughly one case every thirty minutes. These numbers raise
the concern that the quality of BIA decisions is low.̂ '® Lower
quality decisions would increase the number of decisions appealed
310. See id. (refuting Congress's characterization of the increasing federal
immigration cases as "unmanageable").
311. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(c), 1429, 1447(b) (2012) (providing the
potential types and limitations of judicial review available for naturalization
applications).
312. See generally Benson, supra note 124 (elaborating on the many overlooked
factors that may be contributing to this phenomenon).
313. See ¡U at 419.
314. See id. at 418 (indicating that to keep up with the BIA's caseload in 2005, each
BIA member would have had to decide more than 2,375 cases per hour, and
"immediately question [ing] the quahty of decisions made at this rate").
315. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at SI (2012), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/eoir/stats
pub/fyllsyb.pdf.
316. This estimate calculates the number of weekdays (260) subtracted by tbe
number of federal holidays (ten) and the estimated days of leave (thirty). See Snow &
Dismissal Procedures: Federal Holidays, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT. (2011),
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/snow-dismissal-procedures/federal-holidays
/#uri=2011 (last visited Nov. 26, 2013) (listing the federal holidays in 2011).
317. See Benson, supra note 124, at 418 (applying this analysis to statistics from 2005 ).
318. Id.
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to the courts, which may explain the high caseload under which
courts are struggling.""®
Consequently, even assuming that the DHS does in fact possess all
the powers it alleges, these powers still violate noncitizens' procedural
due process rights. At the very least, the constitutionality of the
DHS's actions is in serious doubt, which should prompt courts to
interpret the relevant provisions so as to avoid constitutional
concerns^^"—a task taken up by the next section.
III. DISTRICT COURTS HAVE THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE
REMEDIES WHEN REVIEWING NATURALIZATION APPLICATIONS EVEN
WHILE THE APPLICANTS ARE IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Applying the procedural due process exception is ultimately
unnecessary because the statutory provisions and regulations can
easily be read to avoid this constitutional question. Such avoidance
requires little creativity; in fact, phantom constitutional norms are
probably not necessary at all.'''̂ ' Normally, courts apply phantom
constitutional norms to bend the interpretation of statutes away from
the plenary power doctrine and into conformity with more
mainstream constitutional norms.''̂ '̂  Little to no bending is needed
here—the simple application of canons of statutory construction
demonstrates that district courts can grant at least three types of
remedies when reviewing naturalization applications while an
applicant is in removal proceedings: courts can order the DHS to
naturalize the applicant and they can grant two types of declaratory
relief—"Klene" declarations, which have an issue-preclusive effect; and
declarations of prima facie eligibility, which should be effective to
terminate removal proceedings.
319. Id.
320. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (articulating the "cardinal
principle of statutory interpretation" that when a statute's constitutionality is in
"serious doubt," courts should attempt to construe it to avoid the constitutional
doubt (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); supra notes 61Error! Bookmark not defined.-71 and accompanying text
(using "phantom norms" to aid the interpretation of a statute).
321. See Motomura, supra note 4, at 570 (noting that the application of "phantom
norms" in some cases is very subtle and difficult to distinguish from simple statutory
interpretations that favor noncitizens).
322. See, e.g, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (rejecting the "literal" meaning of an INA
provision and inferring a limitation in order to avoid constitutional transgression).
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A. Textual Basis for Providing District Courts the Ability To Order the DHS
To Naturalize Noncitizen Naturalization Applicants While Removal
Proceedings Are Pending
Even though Congress stripped exclusive authority to naturalize
aliens from the courts and placed it in the DHS's hands,''^'' Congress
left courts the power of judicial review over naturalization
applications.^^* Courts may exercise this power in two instances^^ :̂
when the DHS denies a naturalization application,''̂ ® or when the
DHS fails to make a determination in a timely manner.'̂ '"̂ ^ Courts
must, however, analyze the authority that grants judicial review in
light of other relevant statutes to determine any limitations on
providing relief.̂ *̂ Any ambiguity that arises while analyzing these
statutes must be resolved in favor of the person facing deportation.^^^
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c): Judicial review of application denials
Section 1421 (c) provides:
A person whose application for naturalization under this
subchapter is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer
under section 1447(a) of this title, may seek review of such denial
before the United States district court for the district in which such
person resides . . . . Such review shall be de novo, and the court
shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall,
at the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de novo on the
application.^*
323. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (a) (2012) (stating that this authority is vested in the
Attorney General); see also supra note 107 and accompanying text (describing how
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 allows "the DHS" to be substituted for "Attorney
General" in these statutes).
324. See8 U.S.C. §§ 1421 (c), 1447(b).
325. Noncitizens may also seek judicial review for constitutional questions or
questions of law at any time pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2)(D) and may seek a
very limited review once a final order of removal has been issued against them under
§ 1252(b)(4). See iMöra note 305.
326. 8U.S.C. §1421(c).
327. M §1447 (b).
328. See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738-39 (1989) (Scaha, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing for "harmonious[]"
interpretation of statutes covering similar subjects).
329. See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) ("[S]ince the stakes
are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench
on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible
meanings of the [statutory provision].").
330. 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (c). The sole administrative remedy that must be exhausted
before obtaining judicial review is that applicants must request a hearing before an
immigration officer who rules against them. Id. §§1421(c), 1447(a); 8 C.F.R.
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The text of this provision indicates a few important features. First,
it only authorizes jurisdiction after an application has been denied.^^'
In some cases, the DHS will claim it cannot make a determination on
an application while the applicant is in removal proceedings because
§ 1429 prevents it from doing so.'̂ '̂ ^ In these circumstances, a court
cannot exercise jurisdiction under § 1421 (c) because the application
has not technically been denied.̂ ^^ Such a situation makes affording
judicial review under § 1447 (b) especially important.'̂ '̂ * If courts are
not empowered to grant relief under § 1447 (b), the DHS could block
all judicial review by initiating removal proceedings, remaining silent,
and never officially denying the application.'*''''
Second, once an applicant seeks review under § 1421, the court's
response is mandatory: "[s]uch review shall be de novo, and the
court shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and
shall. . . conduct a hearing de novo on the application."''''^ The
repeated use of the word "shall" indicates that these responses are
required upon the applicant's filing for review.***'
The force of this language becomes even stronger when viewed in
light of the more permissive language in § 1447(b). Under
§ 1447(b), the courts ''may" grant certain remedies.'̂ '̂ * The choice to
§ 336.9(d) (2013); iee also Baez-Fernandez v. INS, 385 F. Supp. 2d 292, 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (denying jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs naturalization application
because he had not exhausted administrative remedies as required by § 1447(a)).
331. 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (c); Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 339-40 (5th Cir.
2007) (bolding that the vacated denial of appellant's application had no continuing
legal effect, and thus the court could not exercise jurisdiction to review it under
§ 1421 (c)). But see supra Part I.C.2 (revealing cases in which the DHS has made
decisions on naturalization applications despite pending removal proceedings and
despite the langtiage of § 1429).
332. Se«, e.g, Saba-Bakare, 507 F.3d at 339.
333. See id. at 340.
334. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (giving noncitizens the option for judicial review of
naturalization determinations delayed more than 120 days).
335. The jurisdictional authority pursuant to § 1447(b) is discussed in more detail
below. Infra Part III.A.2.
336. 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (c) (empbasis added); see United States v. Hovsepian, 359
F.3d 1144, 1162, 1163 n.l6 (9th Cir. 2004) (en bane) (underscoring the requisite
nature of judicial review under § 1421 (c) to prevent the DHS from adjudicating an
application after the noncitizen filed for review under § 1447(b)); Epie v. Caterisano,
402 E. Supp. 2d 589, 590 (D. Md. 2005) (emphasizing the repeated use of tbe word
"shall" in § 1421 (c) to uphold a noncitizen's right to judicial review against remand
to the Agency).
337. See Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1162, 1163 & n.l6; Epie, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 591
("Section 1421 (c) is replete with language mandating the district court's review of
the case.").
338. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (empbasis added); see Epie, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 591
(explaining tbat if a petition is filed properly in accordance with § 1447(b), a
district court bas tbe option to eitber make a naturalization determination or
remand the matter).
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use stronger language in § 1421 (c) further reflects Congress's intent
to make courts' responses mandatory.̂ ^^ Consequently, courts are
not authorized to treat their jurisdiction as discretionary when
reviewing application denials pursuant to § 1421 (c).̂ ^" Rather, courts
are to have "the final luord" once a petitioner has sought review under
the section.^*'
Third, the text does not merely authorize review "of such denial."
In Zayed and De Lara Bellajaro, the courts used the phrase "of such
denial" to conclude that if the DHS denied the application because
removal proceedings were pending, the court could only
determine whether the denial was justified—namely, whether
removal proceedings were in fact pending—but not the merits of
the application.^^^
The text of § 1421 (c), however, explicitly provides for two reviews,
not one. The flrst is a de novo review of the denial, in which the court
makes its own findings of fact and of law, and the second is a de novo
hearing on the application.^^ Accordingly, the first review concerns
the merits of the denial and the second concerns the merits of the
application itself.̂ '''*
The plain language reading of § 1421 (c) clearly supports two levels
of review. The middle phrase " [s]uch review shall be de novo" must
refer to the review stated just before it—the "review of such denial"—
otherwise the word "such" would be meaningless.̂ "*^ The next phrase,
"and the court shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of
law," provides a definition of de novo review.̂ ® The last phrase then
indicates a second type of review—a review of the application itself.'*'
The words "and shall, at the request of the petitioner" separate the
final phrase from the rest of the sentence, thus indicating the
introduction of a second type of review that occurs in the event that
339. £/)¿e, 402F. Supp. 2dat59I.
340. See id. (applying this understanding to determine that the court could not
remand the matter back to the DHS after the Department requested the court do so).
341. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1162.
342. See De Lara Bellajaro v. Shiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2004);
Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004); supra text
accompanying notes 149-160 (describing these cases' discussions on why review
must be limited to whether the applicant was in removal proceedings and not
include the merits of the application).
343. 8U.S.C. §1421(c).
344. See Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 93 F. App'x 469, 471-72 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[District
Courts] may review denials of naturalization petitions without regard to the basis for
the denial.").
345. 8U.S.C. § 1421(c) (emphasis added).
346. Id.; see 5 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 886 (2013) (describing de novo review
similarly to the description in § 1421 (c)).
347. See8U.S.C. § 1421(c).
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the first review—the review of the denial—somehow did not also
include a review of the application.'*''̂  The need for the dual review
described in this provision arises when the DHS's stated reason for
denying the application is the pendency of removal proceedings, as
was the case in De Lara Bellajaro.^'^'^ When this scenario occurs, the
statute requires the court to review not only the reason for the
denial—whether removal proceedings were in fact pending—but also
to review the application itself.̂ •'̂ '' Conducting both reviews prevents
the DHS from deterring review of their naturalization decisions.'"''
348. Interpreting the two phrases £is referring to the same type of review would
render one of the phrases surplusage, which is disfavored by the canons of statutory
construction. See Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2043 (2012)
(clarifying the rule against surplusage).
349. See De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1044, 1046-47 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that for a plaintiff whose naturalization application was denied by the
Attorney General (now the DHS) because of pending removal proceedings and not
the merits of the application, § 1421 (c) only allows district courts to review whether
removal proceedings were in fact pending, not the merits of the application).
350. In particular, the court should review the merits of the application when the
DHS denies the application on the merits despite the pendency of retnoval
proceedings. Theoretically, all denials made after removal proceedings are
initiated would be based on § 1429 and not the merits because § 1429 explicitly
forbids the DHS from considering applications while removal proceedings are
pending. As seen in many cases, however, the DHS does not follow § 1429 so
stringently. See supra Part I.C.l.b (discussing cases in which a final determination
was made while removal proceedings were pending). These denials, even though
they violate § 1429, are nonetheless denials on the merits. Thus, at the very least,
they should trigger a full review of the reasons for the denial, regardless of whether
removal proceedings were pending.
Furthermore, if § 1429 did not stop the DHS from considering the applications in
those situations, it is difficult to see why § 1429 should prevent tbe courts from
considering the applications. See Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 93 F. App'x 469, 471-72 (3d
Cir. 2004) (demonstrating that if the Attorney General could consider an application
despite the limits imposed by § 1429, the case for the court to review the decision
would be even stronger). But see Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 339-40 (5th
Cir. 2007) (vacating a the DHS decision to deny an application under § 1429 because
the decision was made while removal proceedings were pending). Saba-Bakare's
approach of vacating the opinion, though, ignores the mandate of § 1421 (c). See
supra text accompanying notes 336-341 (discussing how § 1421 (c) requires a court to
grant review de novo once an applicant seeks review); see also supra note 139
(discussing this case).
351. One scenario presents an additional reason why courts should be empowered
to review denials based on the pendency of removal proceedings and not just when
they are based on the merits: the DHS can place noncitizens in a never-ending cycle
of initiating removal proceedings even after they have been terminated and
continually denying each application based on the pending removal proceedings. In
Gatcliffe V. Reno, for example, the DHS put the applicant in removal proceedings, an
IJ then terminated the removal proceedings, the DHS subsequently re-initiated
removal proceedings, and the DHS then denied Mr. Gatcliffe's second application,
claiming that § 1429 prevented courts from reviewing it. Gatcliffe v. Reno, 23 F.
Supp. 2d 581, 582 (D.V.I. 1998). Furious with the government's actions, the judge
declared Mr. Gatcliffe to be of good moral character and eligible for naturalization.
See id. at 585; Telephone Interview with James J. Orlow, supra note 209 (discussing his
experience as Mr. Gatcliffe's counsel). If courts are not empowered to provide the
applicant a remedy in such a scenario, the DHS can effectively obstruct judicial
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Eourth, the type of judicial review Congress has chosen to mandate
under § 1421 (c) deserves the highest degree of defense.̂ ^^ Congress
rarely provides for de novo review of agency decisions as it does
under §1421(c); normally, agency decisions are entitled to
considerable deference.^ '̂' Yet the Supreme Court has held that even
highly deferential judicial review cannot be denied except when
there is a persuasive reason to believe the denial was intended by
Congress.̂ ^* In § 1421 (c). Congress stipulated that the review be de
novo, which is the highest level of judicial review available and
requires courts to "make [their] own findings of fact and
conclusions of law."̂ ^̂  Thus, judicial review under § 1421 (c) should
be preserved even more stringently than normal judicial review of
agency actions.̂ ^^
Moreover, the wording of the statute reflects a clear intent to strongly
safeguard judicial review.̂ '̂ ^ Congress did not rest with merely inserting
the phrase "de novo." Instead, it emphasized the phrase by adding its
definition and thtis repeating it: "[A]nd the court shall make its own
findings of fact and concltisions of law . . . ."^^^
Additionally, this de novo review should be protected because it is
often the only opportunity for thorough judicial review.̂ ''® Generally,
once a final order of removal is issued, the only review available is
highly deferential to the agency and must be solely based on the
administrative record.̂ ™
Consequently, analyzing § 1421 (c) leads to the conclusion that
once the DHS denies an application and the applicant files a claim
for judicial review, the district court must review de novo both the
review by continuing to place the noncitizen in removal proceedings even after an IJ
has terminated them.
352. Gonzalez v. Napolitano, 684 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561 (D.NJ. 2010) (citing Stark
V. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), affd on other
grounds, 678 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
353. Nagahi v. INS, 219 F.3d 1166,1169 (10th Cir. 2000).
354. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967); accord Gonzalez, 684 F.
Supp. 2d at 561 (applying this principle to § 1421 (c)).
355. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2012); 73ACJ.S. Aliens% 1912 (2013).
356. 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (c); Conzalei, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (citing Stark, 321 U.S. at
312-13) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see alsoTte Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d
1042, 1045 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to give the INS Cheurón deference).
357. Se« Nagahi, 219 F.3d at 1170.
358. 8 U.S.C. §1421(c). The fact that review is to be de novo also further
undercuts the reasoning in Zayed and De Lara Bellajaro. If the statute so repeatedly
mandates that courts make their own findings of fact and law, how can Congress
have intended review to be limited to merely whether removal proceedings were, in
fact, pending?
359. See Ngwana v. Att'y Gen., 40 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (D. Md. 1999) ("Appellate
review of removal decisions is extremely limited.").
360. See8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (4); Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
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reasons for the denial and the merits of the application. Presumably,
Congress intended this review to be safeguarded against any
limitations based on the statute's repetitive and emphatic language
mandating the court's full, unencumbered review.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b): Judicial review of delayed decisions
Section 1447(b) provides:
If there is a failure to make a determination [on an application for
naturalization] before the end of the 120-day period after the date on
which the examination [of the applicant] is conducted[,] . . . the
applicant may apply to [a] United States district court. . . for a hearing
on the matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may
either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate
instructions, to the [DHS] to determine the matter.̂ ®'
This provision allows courts to issue naturalization orders, resolve
legal or factual questions, remand decisions to the Department, or
perform any combination of these powers, as long as two
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.
The power to issue naturalization orders arises under the clause
allowing courts to "either determine the matter or remand the
matter, with appropriate instructions, to [the DHS] to determine the
matter."''®^ The option of "determine" or "remand the matter" implies
that the word "determine" authorizes courts to make naturalization
decisions themselves or issue declarations that bind the DHS's future
decisions.'®' If courts were forced to defer to the DHS to make all
naturalization decisions, then courts could only "remand the matter"
and not provide de novo review, which is contrary to § 1447(b)'s
plain language.'®''
Courts can only exercise this power under § 1447(b) if jurisdiction
is established in two ways. First, 120 days must have passed since the
DHS examined the applicant.'®^ Second, the DHS must have failed to
make a determination within that time.'®®
361. 8U.S.C. §1447(b).
362. See id.
363. See United States v. Hov.sepian, 359 E.3d 1144, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
bane) (holding that § 1447(b) allows courts to issue instructions and order the
agency to "adopt the court's fact-finding and conclusions"). For examples of
declarations regarding applicants that bind the DHS's future decisions, see the
discussion surrounding Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2012), and
Gonzalez v. Sec'y of DHS, 678 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), supra text accompanying notes
193-205, and infra Part III.B.
364. See Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1160-61.
365. Id.; Kurtis A. Kemper, Construction and Application of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1447(b)
Governing Hearings in Federal District Court when No Determination Is Made on Application
for Naturalization Within 120 Days of Examination of Applicant, 45 A.L.R. FED. 2d 621
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A significant question under the second requirement is whether
the DHS can be said to have "failed" to have made a determination
on an application if removal proceedings were pending during the
120-day period.''^' Pending removal proceedings—at least
theoretically^''*—prohibited the DHS from considering the
application before the 120-day period ended.̂ ^® This limitation
prompts the question of whether an agency can "fail" to do
something that it is statutorily prohibited from doing.^'°
Black's Law Dictionary defines "failure" in two ways: (1)
"[d]eficiency; lack; want" and (2) "[a]n omission of an expected
action, occurrence, or performance."'"' If failure is taken to mean
simply a deficiency, then the simple fact that the DHS did not
make a determination is sufficient to trigger a court's
jurisdiction.'"^ Under this definition, the DHS's motivation for not
acting—the pending removal proceedings and its dutiful
obedience to § 1429—would be irrelevant.
However, if failure means the "omission of an expected action,
occurrence, or performance," then the court does not have
jurisdiction.•'*'̂  The DHS cannot be "expected" to make a
determination on an application when it is statutorily prohibited
from making the determination.^'* Currently, the weight of authority
appears to support this second definition of "failure," though the first
definition may be equally plausible.^'^
§§ 5-6 (2010) (explaining that, while the weight of authority holds that the 120-day
clock begins at the date of the initial interview, a few courts have held that
"examination" refers to the entire process of the investigation of the applicant); .see
ako Ajlani v. Cbertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 237 n.6 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting this ambiguity).
366. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (allowing applicants to apply for review "[i]f there is a
failure to make a determination" on their applications).
367. See id.; Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 240 (refraining from defining "failure" for the
purpose of the statute).
368. See supra Part l.C.I.b for examples of how the DHS disregards this
prohibition in practice.
369. 8 U.S.C. § 1429; Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 240.
370. See Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 240 (stating that there can be no expectation of an
action that is prohibited by law); Saba-Bakare v. Cbertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 340 (5tb Cir.
2007) (holding that the administrative delay is required by statute).
371. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (9tb ed. 2009); see ako Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 240
(providing only the second definition).
372. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 571, at 673.
373. Id. (emphasis added); see also Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 240 (explaining the rare
circtimstances in which judicial review is permitted).
374. Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 240.
375. See Kemper, supra note 365, §§11-12. Compare Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 240
(holding that the district court could not review claims under § 1447(b) while
removal proceedings were pending), and Saba-Bakare, 507 F.3d at 340 (same), with
Meraz v. Comfort, No. 05 C 1094, 2006 WL 861859, at *4 (N.D. 111. Mar. 9, 2006)
(holding that the court retains jurisdiction to review claims under § 1447(b) but that
it must stay the determination until removal proceedings are terminated).
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Courts should be careful not to apply this reasoning, though, when
the DHS does not initiate removal proceedings until afler the 120-day
clock has run. How can the DHS claim that removal proceedings
prevented it from making a determination within 120 days when it
did not commence removal proceedings until after 120 days had
passed?™ This reasoning is especially problematic when the DHS not
only waits to commence the removal proceedings until after the 120
days have passed but also waits until after the noncitizen files a claim
for judicial review."' Under a scenario such as this one, there is no
plausible way the DHS can claim that the delay was caused by § 1429's
prohibition on considering the application.
However, when removal proceedings are truly the cause of the
delay, courts would only be able to assert jurisdiction under
§ 1447(b) if they embraced a definition of "failed" that means simply
"deficiency, lack, or want." They would not be able to assert
jurisdiction if "failed" means the "omission of an expected action."
They should be careful to note, however, if the removal proceedings
were initiated after the 120-day clock had run. If they were, the DHS
376. See Saba-Bakare, 507 F.3d at 340 (explaining that courts cannot award
remedies under § 1447(b) when § 1429 requires the administrative delay).
377. The Second Circuit did exactly this in Ajlani. In that case, Mr. Ajlani applied
for citizenship, and his application was granted approximately five months after the
examination. Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 231-32. Before he could attend his oath ceremony,
however, the DHS discovered that he had a prior conviction and reopened
consideration of his naturalization application. Id. at 232. Two weeks later, Mr.
Ajlani filed a claim for judicial review under § 1447(b). Id. at 233. Nearly two
months after he filed this claim, the DHS formally commenced removal proceedings
against Mr. Ajlani. Id. at 232-33.
The court concluded that it could not review the case under § 1447(b) because
that statute only authorized review of "failure to make a determination." Id. at 240.
The court reasoned that since removal proceedings were pending against Mr. Ajlani,
the DHS was prohibited from considering his application. Id. Thus, the DHS could
not be considered to have "failed" to make a determination on the application when
it was statutorily prohibited from doing so. Id. However, in that case, the DHS did
not commence removal proceedings until long after 120 days had allegedly run,
meaning that the DHS's delay could not have been caused by the pending removal
proceedings. See id. at 232-33, 237 (identifying the date that the 120-day clock ended
and the date removal proceedings were commenced).
The Second Circuit's reasoning in this case may not be a good indication of how
other courts will decide this issue when faced with similar facts. In Ajlani, the court
expressed serious doubts about whether this 120-day clock had run because it was not
sure when the clock should begin. See id. at 237 & nn.6-7. On one hand, 120 days
had passed between the first examination (August 9, 2005) and when the DHS first
granted his application (March 27, 2006). Id. at 231-32, 237 n.7. When
naturalization proceedings were reopened, however, an initial examination had not
even occurred before Mr. Ajlani filed a claim under § 1447(b). See id. at 233. Thus,
when viewed from that perspective, the 120-day clock had not yet run. See id. at 237
n.7. In the end, the court chose to accept that 120 days had passed merely because
neither party contested the issue. Id. at 237. Thus, the court's fiawed reasoning that
the DHS had not "failed" to act was probably motivated hy its uncertainty over
whether the 120-day clock had, in fact, concluded.
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cannot plausibly claim the delay was necessitated by the pending
removal proceedings.'''^
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (a): TheDHS and court authority
Section 1421 (a) confers upon the Secretary of Homeland Security
"[t]he sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United
States." '̂̂  "[S]ole authority," however, must be understood in a way
that leaves room for the courts to review the DHS's decisions and, if
appropriate, come to an opposing conclusion.̂ ^^ Holding otherwise
would render § 1421 (c) ineffective, especially given that the provision
requires courts to reach their own conclusions of law.'*̂ '
Additionally, court orders to naturalize would not violate § 1421 (a)
because § 1447 (b) explicidy gives courts the authority to issue
naturalization orders.̂ ®^ If the power to "determine the matter" and
order naturalization under § 1447(b) does not intrude on the DHS's
sole authority to naturalize, neither would an order to naturalize
made pursuant to § 1421(c).̂ *''' As a result, §1421 (a) cannot be
construed to deprive the courts of the ability to order the DHS to
naturalize an applicant.'^^
378. One question the text of this statute leaves unanswered is whether, after an
applicant files for review under § 1447(b) because of a delay, the DHS can still act on
the application. See generally Kemper, supra note 365, §§ 7-10 (examining various
approaches to this question). The government has often argued that it still retains
this authority and that the court's jurisdiction over the matter is concurrent with the
DHS's. See, e.g-., Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d 403, 406-07 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Second, Fourth, and Ninth circuits have all disagreed, however, holding
instead that once an applicant files a claim for review under § 1447(b), the
court's jurisdiction is exclusive. Id. at 407; Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 384
(4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1159, 1162-63 (9th
Cir. 2004) (en bane).
The text of the statute makes this second interpretation necessary because it gives
courts the authority to either "determine the matter or remand the matter." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1447(b) (2012); see, e.g., Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1160-61. If the DHS still retains the
ability to deny the application once a claim is filed, the option of remanding the
matter would be surplusage. Id. at 1160. The court would have no reason to remand
the matter if the DHS could make its own decision at any time. Id. Consequentiy,
the courts must have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter once a claim is filed. Id.
at 1160-61.
379. 8 U.S.C § 1421 (a); see supra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining
that although the provision refers to "the Attorney General," the Secretary of
Homeland Security has assumed these responsibilities and thus can be substituted).
380. See Gonzalez v. Napohtano, 684 F. Supp. 2d 555, 560 (D.NJ. 2010), affd on
other grounds, 678 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
381. See8 U.S.C. § 1421(c); Gonzalez, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 560.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 362-364 (explaining why).
383. Cf Gonzalez, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 560 (holding that DHS's "sole authority to
naturalize" does not preclude judicial orders to naturalize).
384. See id.
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However, § 1421 (a) does limit judicial review in at least one way:
courts cannot naturalize noncitizens themselves. The text explicitly
confers the responsibility to naturalize exclusively to the DHS.̂ '̂̂
Nonetheless, nothing in the text prevents or limits courts' ability
to order the DHS to naturalize a noncitizen when exercising
judicial review.̂ '̂ ''
4. 8 U.S.C. §1429: Effect of Pending Removal Proceedings
Sections 1421 (c) and 1447(b) must also be harmonized with
§ 1429.̂ ®̂  Section 1429 provides that "no person shall be naturalized
against whom there is outstanding a final finding of
deportability[;] . . . and no application for naturalization shall be
considered by the [Secretary of Homeland Security] if there is pending against
the applicant a removal proceeding."^^^ A careful examination of both
the plain text of the statute and the changes made to it in 1990
reveals that § 1429 is not intended to limit judicial review for
naturalization applicants in removal proceedings.̂ **®
a. Current § 1429
The text of the two clauses in § 1429 refers to two different
situations and applies two different prohibitions.̂ ®" The first clause
applies when removal proceedings have been completed and have
resulted in a final order of removal.''®' In this situation, the statute
states that "no person shall be naturalized."^®^ This prohibition
applies regardless of how the person is naturalized.̂ ® '̂ Section 1429
therefore prohibits courts from ordering the DHS to naturalize an
385. 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (a); see De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046
(9th Cir. 2004) (noting that district courts "no longer have the authority to
naturahze"); Ngwana v. Att'y Gen., 40 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (D. Md. 1999). But see
Gonzalez, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 560 (concluding that courts can do this "at the outer
limit" of their authority).
386. S«e, e.g, Gonzalez, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 560; Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22.
387. See Gonzalez v. Sec'y of DHS, 678 F.3d 254, 258 (3d Cir. 2012); De Lara
Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1046; Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004).
388. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (emphasis added). This quotation inserts "Secretary of
Homeland Security" in place of "Attorney General," to reflect the statute's post-2003
applicability to the DHS. See supra text accompanying note 107.
389. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) ("[I]f Congress has made its
intent in the statute clear, we must give effect to that intent." (quoting Miller v.
French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
390. See Kestelboym v. Chertoff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (D.NJ. 2008); Ngwana,
40 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
391. 8 U.S.C. § 1429; Kestelboym, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 818; Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
392. 8 U.S.C. § 1429.
393. See Kestelboym, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 818.
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applicant against whom a final order of removal has been issued
unless the removal order was vacated.'^''
The second clause, however, applies when applicants' removal
proceedings are still pending.'®"̂  Rather than using the same absolute
prohibition against naturalization. Congress made two relevant
changes: prohibiting (1) the DHS (instead of the courts) from (2)
considering these applicants' applications (instead of from naturalizing
them).'̂ ® These changes create at least two possibilities for
noncitizen applicants currently in removal proceedings that would
not be available to them if a final order of removal had issued.
First, the statute does not prevent recotirse to judicial review under
§§ 1421 (c) or 1447 (b) because the prohibition only blocks review by
the DHS.'̂ ^ Most circuit courts have followed this interpretation and
have thus held that, as a technical matter, courts retain subject matter
jurisdiction under these statutes while removal proceedings are still
pending.'̂ ** However, even though § 1429 does not affect courts'
subject matter jurisdiction, it may still affect the type of relief a court
can grant while exercising such jurisdiction.'̂ ® Therefore, the text
must be analyzed further to determine whether the statute limits
courts' ability to grant relief.''""
Second, the statute's use of the phrase "consider an application"
leaves courts with the ability to order the DHS to naturalize a
394. See id. (explaining that the statute prohibits "all action pertaining to a
naturalization application" in this situation).
395. 8 U.S.C. § 1429; Kestelboym, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 818; Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
396. 8 U.S.C. § 1429; iee also Kestelboym, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (suggesting that
Congress could have used the "same, unambiguous langtiage" as it had in the clause
applying to noncitizens who had an order of removal if Congress had wanted
noncitizens with pending removal proceedings to be treated the same way); Ngwana,
40 F. Supp. 2d at 321 (stating that § 1429 only prevents the INS's (now the DHS's)
consideration of naturalization applications, not its power to naturalize).
397. See, e.g.. De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2004).
398. See cases cited sufna note 139. Furthermore, recent Supreme Court
precedent probably prohibits courts from interpreting § 1429 as establishing a
jurisdictional requirement. In numerous cases over the last decade, the Court has
stressed that mandatory requirements, such as the prohibition against considering
applications, only affect jurisdiction when the language of the statute contains a clear
indication that Congress intended the requirement to affect jurisdiction. Klene v.
Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing several Supreme Court cases,
including Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202-03 (2011),
and Morrison v. Nat'l Ausd. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)). This rule
applies regardless of how emphatic the language is. There is no clear indication in
the text of the immigration statutes that Congress intended § 1429 to affect the
court's jurisdiction to exercise judicial review. See Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d
902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004). Consequentiy, § 1429 does not satisfy the Court's test for
affecting jurisdiction.
399. See supra Part I.C. 1 (discussing cases holding that no relief can be granted).
400. See Gonzalez v. Sec'y of E)HS, 678 F.3d 254, 259 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012)
(contending that it must resolve this issue first before deciding on the merits).
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noncitizen,*"' despite the opposite conclusions several circuit courts
have reached.*"^ In Klene, the Seventh Circuit concluded that it could
not order the DHS to naturalize a noncitizen in removal proceedings
because "|j]udges must not order agencies to ignore constitutionally
valid statutes."*"^ This reasoning is flawed. To "consider an
application" means something very different than to naturalize a
person.*"* The word "consider" means "fix the mind on, with a view
of careful examination; to examine; to deliberate about and ponder
over."*"̂  If a district court ordered the DHS to naturalize a person
against whom removal proceedings were pending, the DHS would
not need to—and in fact should not—"consider" the person's
application.*"'' The DHS would only need to comply with the court's
order to naturalize.*"' While the court would need to consider the
noncitizen's application before issuing an order to naturalize, no
confiict would arise if the court did so because § 1429 only prohibits
the DHS—and not the courts—from considering applications.*"*
b. 1990 textual changes to § 1429
Congress's intent to avoid limitations on judicial review while
removal proceedings are pending can also be seen in the changes it
made in 1990 to the text of § 1429. In its original form, § 1429
prioritized removal proceedings by prohibiting final hearings on
naturalization in the courts while removal proceedings were still
401. See Gonzalez v. Napolitano, 684 F. Supp. 2d 555, 560 (D.NJ. 2010), affd on
other grounds, 678 F.3d 254.
402. See supra Part LC (discussing the positions of the circuit courts).
403. Klene, 697 F.3d at 668.
404. See Gonzalez, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63 (providing a lengthy discussion of the
definition of "consider").
405. Id. (quoting United States v. Haynes, 265 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916 (W.D. Tenn.
2003), and numerous other sources to expound on the term).
406. See id. at 563 (indicating that if "consider" in 8 U.S.C. § 1429 means the
same thing as it does in other statutory contexts and as defined by several
dictionaries, the Attorney General will not "consider" an application if the court
orders relief for the petitioner).
407. See id. at 564.
408. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (2012). None of the circuit courts have attempted to analyze
tbis reasoning. When reviemng a lower court's analysis along these lines, for
example, the Third Circuit merely stated in a footnote that the argument did "not
comport with the priority of removal proceedings." Gonzalez v. Sec'y of DHS, 678
F.3d 254, 259 n.6 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 906 n.5
(6th Cir. 2004) (stating, in response to the district court holding that the court could
order the Department to naturalize a noncitizen, "[w]e are at sometbing of a loss . . .
to understand how judicial fiat can overcome the statutoty bar of § 1429"). These
cursory statements fail to adequately respond to this reasoning.
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pending."*"̂  In 1990, however. Congress chose to transfer the
responsibility to naturalize noncitizens from the courts to an
administrative agency—today, USCIS.*'" With this shift. Congress
chose to change only one phrase in § 1429'"': "no petition for
naturalization shall be finally heard by a naturalization court if there is
pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding" was
changed to "no application for naturalization shall be considered by the
[Secretary of Homeland Security] if there is pending against the applicant
a deportation proceeding.'""^
With this change, § 1429's new purpose was to prevent USCIS—
rather than the courts—from considering a noncitizen's application
while ICE (the agency responsible for deportation) attempts to
deport the noncitizen.^''' Therefore, § 1429's purpose is now to
coordinate actions between the two agencies as opposed to handling
conflicts between the courts and the deporting agency.'"^
Consequently, § 1429 still serves to prioritize removal proceedings,
but only over agency consideration of naturalization applications and
not over court consideration.^'^ If Congress had intended otherwise,
it would have been more explicit, especially given that it concurrently
added the option of de novo review in the courts.'*"'
Furthermore, interpreting § 1429 as depriving courts of the ability
to exercise judicial review makes the statute say far more than
Congress ever intended it to say, even in its pre-1990 form.'"' Beyond
simply giving priority to removal proceedings, such an interpretation
409. See, e.g., Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 544 (1955); iee supra
text accompanying notes 82-91 (discussing the history of court authority to
naturalize citizens).
410. See supra text accompanying notes 100-106 (summarizing the changes made
in 1990 to the immigration process by Congress).
411. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 407(d), 104 Stat. 4978, 5041
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1429).
412. Compare 8 U.S.C. §1429 (1988) (emphasis added), with 8 U.S.C. §1429
(2012) (emphasis added).
413. See supra text accompanying notes 107-114 (identifying the changes within
the immigration system that led to the new purpose and role of § 1429).
414. See Ngwana v. Att'y Gen., 40 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Md. 1999) (stating that
the priority provision now limits the INS (now the DHS) rather than the courts).
415. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (2012); see Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 321 (demonstrating the
operation of the priority provision).
416. See Gonzalez v. Napolitano, 684 F. Supp. 2d 555, 562-63 (D.NJ. 2010), affd
on other grounds, 678 F.Sd 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
417. See Grewal v. Ashcroft, 301 F. Supp. 2d 692, 696 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (clarifying
that the purpose of § 1429 is not to "divest district courts of the jurisdiction
[§ 1421 (c) ] provides to review administrative denials of naturalization").
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would give the DHS the authority to trump the judicial review
protections that Congress explicitly mandated.""*
Admittedly, in most situations, allowing district courts to order
noncitizens to be naturalized might lessen some of the safeguards
against the race "between naturalization and removal proceedings"
that the 1950 Congress intended to end.""^ Applicants might still
rush to the courts whenever their applications are denied.*^"
Congress, however, chose to lessen these protections in 1990 by
implementing judicial review and altering the text of § 1429 to
restrict USCIS and not the courts.''^'
Consequently, an order to naturalize would not violate the intent
behind § 1429, whether as expressed in the text itself or as inferred
from the text's history.*^^ To the contrary, interpreting the statute in
this way would give full effect to (1) § 1421 (a) by giving the DHS sole
authority to naturalize, (2) §§ 1421 (c) and 1447(b) by providing
judicial review for application denials and delays, respectively, and
(3) § 1429 by prohibiting the DHS from considering applications
while the applicant is in removal proceedings. If Congress had
intended a different meaning, the words were well within its
418. Id. at 696-97. Additionally, even if it is still § 1429's purpose to safeguard
against a race to the courthouse once the DHS commences removal proceedings,
that purpose would not be relevant when the DHS initiates removal proceedings after
the noncitizen files a claim for judicial review. See id. at 697 (explaining that in Ms.
Grewal's case, she was not racing against any removal proceedings when she chose to
seek jtidicial recourse).
419. Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2008).
420. See id.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 409-412 (illustrating Congress's decision
to change only one portion of § 1429).
422. In addition to permitting courts to issue orders to naturalize, § 1429 must
allow courts to issue declarations of prima facie eligibility. See supra notes 220-222
and accompanying text (noting that in their efforts to resolve Acosta Hidalgo's
determination that only the DHS could make prima facie eligibility declarations to
terminate removal proceedings, the Sixth and Fourth Circuits in Shewchun v.
Holder, 658 F.3d 557, 564-65 (6th Cir. 2011), and Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801,
807 (4th Cir. 2010), respectively, held that the DHS can make declarations of prima
facie eligibility without violating § 1429). If the Sixth and Fourth Circuits' holdings
are correct, however, it means that courts can likewise make prima facie eligibility
declarations without violating § 1429. See Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 93 F. App'x 469,
471-72 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that because § 1429 restricts the DHS but makes
no reference at all to the courts, it is still an open question whether courts can make
prima facie eligibility declarations). After all, § 1429 does not even reference the
courts; it only restricts the DHS. Id. at 471. Of course, whether such declarations will
have any effect at terminating removal proceedings under Acosta Hidalgo is another
question that will be discussed in the next section.
423. Indeed, they were in the same provision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (2012) ("[N]o
person shall be naturalized . . . ."); Gonzalez v. Napolitano, 684 F. Supp. 2d 555, 562-
63 (D.NJ. 2010) (arguing that had Congress intended to preclude the DHS "from
'granting' citizenship once removal proceedings ha[d] begun," it would not have
used tbe word "consider"), affd on other grounds, 678 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
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B. Declaratory Judgments Would Be Effective Notwithstanding Acosta
Hidalgo
Aside from ordering the DHS to naturalize a petitioner, courts can
also issue two kinds of declaratory judgments: "Klene" declarations
and prima facie eligibility declarations. In Klene, the Seventh Circuit
held that district courts can resolve a question of fact in the
noncitizen's favor and that such a resolution has preclusive effect on
the question in subsequent removal proceedings and naturalization
determinations.*^* In Gonzalez, the Third Circuit held that courts
could declare that a noncitizen is prima facie eligible for
naturalization "notwithstanding whatever role [the declaration] may
play in terminating removal proceeding[s]."*^^
Some courts have hesitated to issue declaratory judgments and
held that the judgments would not have any binding legal effect and
would, therefore, be "purely advisory."* '̂' However, courts can issue
declaratory judgments as a remedy if such declarations resolve a
dispute in a way that "affects the behavior of the defendant towards
the plaintiff."* '̂' Otherwise, if this standard is not met, declaratory
judgments are merely advisory opinions and thus impermissible.*^^
In practice, declaratory judgments have quite an effect, normally
prompting the DHS to voluntarily terminate removal proceedings
and naturalize the applicant.*^® Notwithstanding, courts must analyze
the effect of declaratory judgments before issuing them to determine
whether they are binding as a matter of law or are purely advisory.*'̂ "
The legal effect of each type of declaratory relief is discussed below.
1. "Klene declarations": Declarations that have issue-preclusive effect
In Klene, Judge Easterbrook appeared to have paved the way for
a new type of remedy: a declaration that resolves some factual
424. Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2012)
425. Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at 258, 260.
426. See supra text accompanying note 161 (discussing the limited effects of
declaratory Judgments).
427. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987) (emphasis omitted); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (creating declaratory Judgments as an available remedy "[i]n a case
of actual controversy within [the court's] Jurisdiction"); FED. R. Civ. P. 57
advisory committee's note (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that "[a]
declaratoryjudgment is appropriate when it will terminate the controversy giving
rise to the proceeding").
428. Ka Lok Lau v. Holder, 880 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280 (D. Mass. 2012).
429. See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text (noting how, as a practical
matter, the DHS normally concedes to prevent an appeal, which might generate
adverse precedent).
430. See Ka Lok Lau, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 281-82 (concluding that declaratory relief
would only help in a hypothetical future controversy, not a present one); .see also
supra note 161 (illustrating competing views on the effects of declaratoryjudgments).
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question that may have motivated either the application's denial
or the initiation of removal proceedings.^" Theoretically, the
declaration would then have issue-preclusive effect on any
subsequent proceedings, such as removal proceedings or
application determinations.""^
A "Klene declaration" would trigger mutual-issue preclusion, which
requires a court's determination of an issue of fact or law in one
proceeding to be conclusive on all subsequent actions between the
parties.'"' For example, if a judge declared that a noncitizen's
marriage was valid, that holding would force the DHS and IJs to
accept the validity of the marriage.'"'' Consequently, if the alleged
fraudulent marriage was the sole reason for denying the application
or initiating removal proceedings, an IJ would theoretically be forced
to terminate the proceedings, and the DHS would be forced to
accept the application.'''^
It is difficult to predict, however, what legal justification an IJ would
have for terminating the proceedings. While an IJ might be bound to
accept that an alleged fraudulent marriage is, in fact, valid, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1239.2 (f) requires the IJ to only terminate removal proceedings
upon a finding of prima facie eligibility for naturalization.'"® Prima
facie eligibility, according to the BIA, can only be found when the
DHS has made an affirmative communication to that effect.*"
431. See Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2012).
432. Id.
433. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008); Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 27 (1980); iee also Klene, 697 F.3d at 669 (noting that issue preclusion
applies in multiple contests between the federal government and the same adversary,
and would therefore be applicable to a noncitizen challenging naturalization
determinations and removal proceedings in both administrative and judicial fora
(citing United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 169 (1984))).
434. Klene, 697 ¥.Sd at 669.
435. See id. (claiming that such a declaration "would bring the removal proceeding
to a prompt close"); iee also 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (2012) ("Further necessary or proper
relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable
notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by
such judgment."). Such a declaration would probably not work in reverse, however.
SeeNesari v. Taylor, 806 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854, 866, 868 (E.D. Va. 2011) (rejecting the
argument that an IJ's declaration of a valid marriage and termination of removal
proceedings should have preclusive effect because § 1421 (c) mandates de novo
review and thus the court is not bound by prior administrative proceedings). Also,
§ 1429 explicitly states that decisions to terminate removal proceedings have no
effect on USCIS's determination of whether to naturalize. 8 U.S.C. § 1429; Nesari,
806 E. Supp. 2d at 868-69.
436. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(0 (2013).
437. In re Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 106 (BIA 2007). Again, practically
speaking, it is likely that an IJ would terminate the removal proceedings anyway in
response to a declaration from a federal court. See supra note 99 (listing cases in
which IJs had terminated removal proceedings without an affirmative
communication from the DHS). The question here, however, is whether the IJ
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However, such a declaration might allow the noncitizen to
challenge subsequent the DHS actions in federal court, even if the
IJ could not terminate removal proceedings. For example, if the
DHS later denied the noncitizen's application or kept the
noncitizen in removal proceedings, when challenged, the DHS
might need to justify its actions in light of the federal court's issue-
preclusive finding of fact.*'̂ *
2. Declarations of prima facie eligibility
Another remedy courts may grant when exercising judicial
review while removal proceedings are pending is to declare the
noncitizen "prima facie eligib[le] for naturalization."*^'^ It is
again arguable, however, that court-ordered declarations of
prima facie eligibility do not have any legally binding effect with
regard to terminating removal proceedings.**" The BIA in Acosta
Hidalgo interpreted 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) as preventing IJs from
terminating removal proceedings unless the DHS first makes an
affirmative communication that the noncitizen is "prima facie
eligib[le] for naturalization."**'
Several circuit courts have suggested that the BIA's
interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) is owed deference and
therefore cannot be overturned unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.**^ These courts contend that
Acosta Hidalgo met this standard.**^
The BIA's interpretation does not, however, meet even this
deferential standard because it both nullifies the regulation and
renders it inconsistent with statutory authority. Courts have an
obligation to interpret regulations harmoniously with each other
would technically have the legal authority to do so. See supra note 161-165 and
accompanying text (explaining that doubt over this fact has discouraged some
federal courts from granting declaratory relief).
438. See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (providing that further relief based on a declaratory
judgment may be granted); Stauffer Chem, Co., 464 U.S. at 169 (establishing that
mutual issue preclusion applies against the federal government when litigating
against the same party).
439. Gonzalez v. Sec'y of DHS, 678 F.3d 254, 260 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§1239.2(0).
440. See supra text accompanying notes 161, 208 (observing that while court-
ordered declarations of prima facie eligibility are arguably "purely advisory," tbey
tend to result in the government terminating removal proceedings and naturalizing
the applicant).
441. Acosta Hidalgo, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 105-06; see supra notes 96-99, 121-128 and
accompanying text (describing tbe development of tbis interpretation).
442. See siipra notes 217-219 and accompanying text (explaining the position of
the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits).
443. See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
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and with relevant statutes.'''''' The interpretation at issue in Acosta
Hidalgo violates this fundamental canon of construction and thus
must not be followed.
First, if 8 U.S.C. § 1429 prohibits the DHS from making prima facie
eligibility determinations while removal proceedings are pending,
interpreting 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (f) so as to allow only die DHS to make
these determinations nullifies the regulation. '̂'-' Courts have thus far
failed to sufficiently answer how the DHS can legitimately make a
prima facie eligibility determination v^thout even considering the
noncitizen's application. In Shewchun v. Holder and Barnes v. Holder,
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits reasoned that because 8 U.S.C. § 1429
and 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (f) must be reconciled, the DHS simply must be
able to make prima facie eligibility determinations.'''"'
However, this conclusion was not necessary. Nothing in the text
of 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (f) limits the prima facie eligibility
requirement to the DHS; only the BIA's subsequent interpretation
of the regulation limits the requirement in this way. Thus, 8
C.F.R. § 1239(f) does not conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1429 by itself—
the BIA's interpretation makes it conflict.'''" The exact opposite
interpretation of the regulation would have avoided the conflict
altogether—the BIA could have prohibited IJs from using the DHS-
issued prima facie eligibility determinations to terminate removal
proceedings but allowed IJs to use court-issued declarations, or,
potentially, use their own judgment.'*'*^
444. Jettv. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 739 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[W]here the text permits, statutes dealing
vnth similar subjects should be interpreted harmoniously."); Rice v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 13 F.3d 1563, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying this principle to regulations).
Note that the Second Circuit's statement in Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135, 142
(2d Cir. 2009), is anomalous with this well-established principle: "it is not a
judicial role to save a regulation that now conflicts . . . with the underlying
statute."
445. See supra text accompanying notes 248-251 (analjizing how 8 U.S.C. § 1429 and 8
C.F.R. § 1239.2(f), when read together, can result in the deprivation of judicial review).
446. Shewchun v. Holder, 658 F.3d 557, 564-65 (6th Cir. 2011 ) ; Barnes v. Holder,
625 F.3d 801, 807 (4th Cir. 2010); see supra notes 220-222 and accompanying text.
447. Even if the text of § 1239.2(f) did require prima facie eligibility
determinations to come from the DHS, a much simpler answer would have been to
simply strike the regulation down as exceeding statutory authority. The regulation's
wording makes this unnecessary, however.
448. See Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 93 F. App'x 469, 472 (3d Gir. 2004) (questioning
whether the DHS could make prima facie eligibility determinations now that § 1429
prevented the DHS but not the courts). The courts' other hases for upholding Acosta
Hidalgo also seem weak. For example, courts cannot reasonably rely on the
government's testimony that it can and does make prima facie eligibility
determinations while removal proceedings are pending in order to answer the
question of how it can do so without violating § 1429 as the Fourth Circuit did in
Barnes. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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In contrast to the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, the Second and Third
Circuits in Perriello and Zegrean v. Attorney Generaf'^'^ respectively
concluded that the conflict between 8 U.S.C. § 1429 and the BIA's
interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 1239(f) simply means that neither the
DHS, nor anyone else, can make prima facie eligibility
determinations.*''" If these courts are correct, the BIA's
interpretation forecloses any possibility of the regulation
accomplishing its purpose, which is to allow a way for noncitizens to
terminate removal proceedings and have their applications heard."* '̂
Therefore, such a rendering is inconsistent with the regulation.
Second, even if Perriello and Zegrean are wrong and the DHS can
make prima facie eligibility determinations, the BIA's interpretation
of 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) still renders the regulation practically without
effect because the DHS is unlikely to ever act this way. Because the
DHS places noncitizens in removal proceedings and it can take them
out under its own authority,'''̂ ^ the DHS has no reason to affirmatively
communicate a prima facie eligibility declaration. If the DHS wanted
to terminate removal proceedings so that it could review the
noncitizen's naturalization application, the Department would not go
to an IJ to do so.̂ '"''
This assumption appears to be supported by noncitizens'
experiences.'*''̂  The DHS rarely, if ever, makes any determination on
prima facie eligibility for the purposes of an 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (f)
.''̂ '̂  Nothing requires the Department to respond to a request
449. 602 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
450. See id. at 274; Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135, 140-42 (2d Cir. 2009).
451. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2013); see Perriello, 579 F.3d at 138 (suggesting that even
though the law in effect seems to be contradictory and "chasing its tail," the court
must nevertheless give deference to the BIA's interpretation of its own regulations) ;
see also Zegrean, 602 F.3d at 274-75 (agreeing with Perriello's analysis and conclusion,
cind stating that the confusion created by § 1239.2(f) is not for the courts, but rather
for Congress or the DHS, to resolve).
452. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the DHS's authority to
remove noncitizens) ; see also note 209 and accompanying text (providing examples of
the DHS taking noncitizens out of removal proceedings).
453. Cf supra Part I.C.l.b. (providing examples of cases in which, despite § 1429's
prohibition, the DHS has decided naturalization applications notwithstanding the
pendency of removal proceedings).
454. Se£ generally inßn note 457 and accompanying text (listing cases in which applicants
have unsuccessfully petitioned the DHS for prima facie eligibility determinations).
455. Perriello, 579 F.3d at 138 (listing other examples, in addition to itself, in which
DHS has refused to respond to a request for a prima facie eligibility determination).
Also, before Acosta Hidalgo reached the BIA, the Ij in that case became frustrated
with the DHS's unresponsiveness to the noncitizen's request for a statement of prima
facie eligibility and directed the government's attorney to present something in
writing indicating the DHS's position on the motion to terminate removal
proceedings. H. Raymond Fasano & Donald F. Madeo, Holding by Administrative Fiat:
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for such a determination.*"'' In many cases, petitioners have sought
writs of mandamus to compel a determination, but these attempts
have routinely been unsuccessful.*" In at least one of these cases, the
DHS replied that it could not comply with a writ of mandamus because
to make such a determination would violate § 1429's prohibition on
considering naturalization applications.*^®
CONCLUSION
For over 125 years, the plenary power doctrine has been an
anomaly. It has frozen immigration law in a time when individual
rights were not prioritized and courts exercised little control over
Congress and executive agencies.
From this perspective, the DHS's power to limit judicial review is
perhaps unsurprising. In most circuits, the DHS is able to use
removal proceedings as a litigation tactic for blocking statutorily
mandated judicial review of its naturalization decisions. The
Department can do this because it has convinced courts that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1429 prohibits the courts from providing remedies to applicants
while in removal proceedings. The DHS has done this even though
§ 1429 only prohibits the Department from considering these
applications; the statute makes no reference to the courts.
Furthermore, the DHS itself often violates § 1429 by fully
adjudicating applications while removal proceedings are pending. At
the same time, the Department has persuaded courts that § 1429 still
prevents it from reviewing these adjudications.
Why Matter of Acosta Hidalgo Was Erroneously Decided, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 841,
842 (2007). The DHS failed to respond even to this order. Id.
456. Perriello, 579 F.3d at 138.
457. E.g., Frétas v. Hansen, No. l:06CV1475, 2008 WL 4404276, at *5 (N.D. Ohio,
Sept. 23, 2008); Sandoval-Valenzuela v. Gonzalez, No. C 08-2361 RS, 2008 WL
3916030, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2008); Escobar-Garfias v. Gonzales, No. 06-CV-103-
BR, 2007 WL 281657, at *9 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 2007); Fuks v. Devine, No. 05 C 5666,
2006 WL 2051321, at *2-4 (N.D. fll. July 20, 2006).
458. See Frétas, 2008 WL 4404276, at *3-4. As perhaps an indication of the DHS's
attitude toward this statute, the Department nonetheless advised that the noncitizen
was not prima facie eligible for naturalization. See id. at *l-2.
Several authorities have also criticized the BIA's assertions in Acosta Hidalgo and
Cruz that IJs have less expertise over naturalization eligibility than the DHS because,
in fact, IJs regularly make decisions related to naturalization eligibility, such as
character assessments. See, e.g., Shewchun v. Holder, 658 F.3d 557, 563 (6th Cir.
2011) (noting petitioner's brief to this effect); In r« Acosta Hidalgo, 24 1. & N. Dec.
103, 109 (B.l.A. 2007) (Filppu, Board Member, concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (proposing more decision-making power for IJs to assess prima facie eligibility
when the DHS does not address the issue); Fasano & Madeo, supra note 455, at 846
(arguing that IJs are actually often in a better position than the DHS to make prima
fecie eligibility determinations).
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Additionally, the DHS has successfully persuaded the BIA that 8
C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) prevents IJs from terminating removal proceedings
without an affirmative communication from the Department that the
noncitizen is prima facie eligible for naturalization. Not only does
this interpretation lack any basis in the text of the statute, it also
nullifies the regulation. The DHS placed the person in removal
proceedings in the first place, thus it is highly unlikely that the
Department would ever issue the necessary communications to
terminate those proceedings—especially considering it could
terminate the removal proceedings unilaterally if it so desired. Thus,
an initiation of removal proceedings effectively trumps any possibility
of judicial review. Clearly, courts are not applying the normal rules
of statutory and regulatory construction for the purposes of judicial
review in these situations.
Nevertheless, the prospects for change are positive. The plenary
power doctrine appears to be weakening as more and more courts
avoid its application in an attempt to grant justice to noncitizens.
Some courts have found ways of characterizing agency powers as
procedural rather than substantive and thus have dismantled the DHS's
powers to block judicial review under the procedural due process
exception. Other courts have relied on subconstitutional
approaches, such as interpreting immigration statutes in a way that
avoids the plenary power doctrine's infiuence.
The DHS's control over judicial review of its naturalization
decisions can be limited using both of these approaches.
Additionally, courts have an obligation to review naturalization
applications whenever a noncitizen meets the jurisdictional
requirements of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(c) and 1447(b), regardless of
whether removal proceedings are pending. Options for providing
remedies include ordering the DHS to naturalize an applicant,
making an issue-preclusive declaration of material fact, or
declaring that the applicant is prima facie eligible for
naturalization. Allowing these remedies not only secures
noncitizens statutory and constitutional rights, but also helps
introduce some measure of sensibility to an area of law that has
been greatly distorted for many years.
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